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ABSTRACT

Understanding Myth and Myth as Understanding:
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Mytho-Logic Narration

by

Sandra Bartlett Atwood, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2015

Major Professor: Dr. Lynne S. McNeill
Program: American Studies (Folklore)

I wanted to see if there were points of overlap between the various accounts of creation
found in folklore, philosophy and physics. In order to justify such a project, I initially considered
literature from each of these disciplines regarding the necessity of interdisciplinary dialogue
generally and specifically the need for both intuition and logic when considering how anything
actually exists. Through my research and casual observation, I hypothesized that opposition
seemed to be a universal characteristic of nature. I then looked at how each discipline has
described fundamentally opposing pairs and created a list of primary features that those accounts
had in common. Finally, I demonstrated (in my study The Symmetry of God) the utility of an
interdisciplinary approach to myth by showing how science and philosophy can improve our
understanding of myth and conversely how folklore (myth in particular) may suggest meaningful
and potentially revolutionary relationships not yet considered by science.

(118 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Understanding Myth and Myth as Understanding:
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Mytho-Logic Narration

Sandra Bartlett Atwood

I wanted to see if there were points of overlap between the various accounts of creation
found in folklore, philosophy and physics. In order to justify such a project, I initially considered
literature from each of these disciplines regarding the necessity of interdisciplinary dialogue
generally and specifically the need for both intuition and logic when considering how anything
actually exists. Through my research and casual observation, I hypothesized that opposition
seemed to be a universal characteristic of nature. I then looked at how each discipline has
described fundamentally opposing pairs and created a list of primary features that those accounts
had in common. Finally, I demonstrated (in my study The Symmetry of God) the utility of an
interdisciplinary approach to myth by showing how science and philosophy can improve our
understanding of myth and conversely how folklore (myth in particular) may suggest meaningful
and potentially revolutionary relationships not yet considered by science.
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PREFACE

“Of all the frictional resistances, the one that most retards human movement is ignorance…The
friction which results from ignorance...can be reduced only by the spread of knowledge and the
unification of the heterogeneous elements of humanity. No effort could be better spent.” (Tesla
1900, 211)

As a young Christian1 girl with an insatiable curiosity for creation narratives of all kinds,
I began to notice that all sacred accounts of creation contained the notion of necessarily opposing
pairs. One of the first allusions to this phenomenon that I encountered early on is found in 2
Nephi 2:11, 13-16, 27 of The Book of Mormon, “For it must needs be, that there is an opposition
in all things. If not so…righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither
holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in
one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither
death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor
insensibility…And if these things are not there is no God. And if there is no God we are not,
neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be acted
upon; wherefore, all things must have vanished away…it must be that there was an
opposition…Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore,
man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other….”
As I grew, my circle of interest expanded and I became fascinated by philosophy and
physics, particularly the way idealists and realists both seemed to make a reasonable case for
how anything comes to exist. I wondered, “Could they both be right?” Similarly, I puzzled once

1

I am a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, often referred to as Mormons.
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again as monists made seemingly sound arguments for how all things are essentially one or
uniform and yet others effectively contended that all things are many or multiform. As I became
familiar with quantum mechanics and various unification theories produced by theoretical
physicists, I wondered if these sundry disciplines and traditions might not be pointing at the same
phenomenon—a fundamental opposition of some kind—to describe the source and disposition of
existence; that “existence” itself may be binary “existence-nonexistence” which seemed to
coordinate many of these apparently disparate accounts of creation both from within each
discipline as well as across disciplines.
In this way, my thesis initially presumes and ultimately concludes as well, that the most
fundamental entity in the world is perhaps neither existence nor nonexistence but rather the
dynamic co-existence of the two. Furthermore, I propose that whether referring to the methods
for understanding the world or to the phenomena themselves, the question of the one and the
many, or the simultaneously particular and universal nature of existence, is best accommodated
by symmetry—distinction without difference; that by assuming or at least applying
methodological symmetry to binary phenomena, we can somewhat reconcile the age old breach
in understanding how anything exists.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Although folklore, philosophy and physics are perceived to occupy distinct spheres, are
there points of overlap? Do the discourses of folklore, philosophy and physics contain
mythological elements? Employing folklorist David Hufford’s methodological symmetry, I have
examined philosopher Galen Strawson’s equal-status monism and physicist Niels Bohr’s
principle of complementarity alongside folklorist Claude Lévi-Strauss’ binary opposition theory.
Methodological symmetry was developed by Hufford as a way of investigating and interrelating
meaningful correlations between professional and vernacular beliefs surrounding what he
assumed to be a singular medical phenomenon or experience. It “is a methodology based on the
theoretical premise that the same questions must be applied to medicine as are applied to the lay
community” (Hufford 1997, 54:1-14). Applying Hufford’s method to my interdisciplinary study
of existence and the mutually dependent or relational nature of opposites, I have asked the same
questions of folklore, philosophy, and physics, examining each discipline’s treatment of what I
consider to be a single—albeit complex or multi-faceted—natural phenomenon.
According to Alan Dundes, “A myth is a sacred narrative explaining how the world and
man came to be in their present form” (Dundes 1998, 1). Elliot Oring defines narrative as,
“another word for story.” He explains, “Narrating is a method by which an experience is
transformed into a verbal account…It should be noted that nowhere in this definition is myth held
to be untrue—rather, that the narrative is held by someone to be ultimately true enables its
characterization by the folklorist as myth” (Oring 1986, 121-124). While the terms ‘myth’ and
‘fiction’ have come to be nearly synonymous in post-modern western culture, the original
connotations of myth are derived from the Greek word mythos meaning word or speech. In
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archaic Greek, mythos is uniquely reserved for enigmatic, authoritative speech; God-like reason,
whereas logos typically refers to rational, domestic speech; common reason or logic (McGonagill
2010).2 In Les Enfants Sauvages: Mythe et Réalité, Lucien Malson further defines myth as “the
expression of unobservable realities in terms of observable phenomena” (Leach 1962, 34).
Based on years of casual observations and an enduring interest in how anything came to
exist, I have developed a familiarity with creation narratives of all kinds. More recently and with
these particular definitions of myth in mind, I have, by means of both, the comparative method
and paradigmatic structuralism, considered sacred narratives alongside the relatively modern
“myths” produced by metaphysics and quantum mechanics in search of a common theme that
might generalize3 these otherwise seemingly disparate accounts. Indeed, although folklore,
philosophy and physics are usually perceived to occupy distinct spheres, there seemed to be
points of overlap and the discourses of each of these segregated disciplines did in fact contain
mythological elements. One of the persisting motifs I noticed throughout the various accounts is
a phenomenon I will be referring to as binary, essential, fundamental or necessary opposition.4
Having identified a suitable singularity for my case study, I then instigated my project by
employing Hufford’s Methodological Symmetry to examine perspectives in folklore, philosophy
and physics regarding the mutually dependent nature of opposites.

2

Taken from a 2010 ancient Greek philosophy lecture given by Dr. Gary McGonagill at Utah State University and
used here with his express consent.
3
Webster’s Dictionary provides the following definitions for generalize: give a general form to; derive or induce a
general conception or principle from the particulars of; draw a general conclusion from; give general applicability
to; make indefinite.
4
Because each discipline’s specific term for two-fold phenomena comes loaded with predetermined meanings and
nuances specific to a particular author or domain, I have devised the generic term “necessary opposition” which at
this point is only meant to suggest that some phenomena are fundamentally and therefore, inescapably (or
necessarily) comprised of opposing traits. However, while I will also be using other common terms such as binary,
essential and fundamental for their descriptive value, note that my general use of “binary opposition” does
somewhat differ from Levi-Strauss’ specific use of the term.
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The most problematic features of my preliminary inquiry were its scope and comparative
nature. Because it was neither practical nor possible to review the creation myth of every folk
group, much less all the variant accounts of each type for this project, I necessarily had to limit
my sample, this was mostly determined by my casual and nonsystematic study of myth over the
past thirty years or so—although I did follow up on suggested readings I received or came across
throughout the course of this project as well as purposefully reviewing several of the accounts
that had stood out to me over the years as being particularly useful to this study. Additional risks
of my cross-cultural analysis included: the loss of important distinctions caused by simply
picking one version over another, the neglect of idiosyncratic elements resulting from my focus
on paradigmatic features, and subsequently the de-contextualization of fundamentally culturebound aspects of myth. Furthermore, I compared themes from sacred narratives, not only crossculturally but across disciplines as I attempted to align these ancient accounts with contemporary
ones, which potentially amplified the aforementioned risks in the process. So “Why compare
them at all?” you may ask.
I believe Alan Dundes answers this question when he asserts, “One of the most
disheartening aspects of…the scientific study of folklore, is the persistent lack of analysis and
interpretation” (Dundes 1998, 120). Dundes does not even seem to mind which critical method is
employed so long as we commit ourselves to coupling our study of folklore with “thoughtful
commentary” (Dundes 1998, 120). He encourages folklorists to, first recognize parallels in
folklore, and then attempt to explain the underlying meaning of those elements in some
systematic way that ultimately transcends the specific context of any particular performance or
text. Drawing on “Bloody Mary” scholarship to facilitate his argument, Dundes says of his
distinguished colleagues, “[I]t is clear that folklorists…know about the…ritual, but it is equally
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obvious that its basic underlying significance, if any, seems to have eluded them,” concluding
that folklorists are apparently either “unwilling or unable to interpret folklore” (Dundes 1998,
122; my emphasis). 5
According to Jacob Grimm, once folklore has been “salvage[d] and collect[ed],” it must
be “research[ed] in detail” if we are to ever understand poetry, history, and language in relation
to its origins. Grimm’s reasoning is both cryptic and intriguing: “Despite all the ridicule and
derision with which it [myth] has been treated, it has survived in secret, unconscious of its own
beauty, and carrying its irrepressible essence alone within itself” (Dundes 1999, 5; my emphasis).
Likewise, folklorist Bruce Jackson recalls Edward D. Ives’ shrewd observation, “it all goes to
show that the facts—for whatever reason collected—know more than we do at the time, and, if
they are properly saved and stored away, they may someday answer questions we never knew
enough to ask” (Jackson and Ives 1996, 169).
Borrowing from comparative mythology and paradigmatic structuralism, I have
distinguished a single property, necessary opposition, which is common to all myths, from “those
that are peculiar to one or more only” in an attempt to isolate this most prevailing element for
further analysis. Not so much because common themes are more “important”—as Müller and
others had supposed—but because they are more essential and also because they are better suited
to empirical analysis. Hence, while folklorists may never arrive at the origins of myth, we can
nevertheless gain meaningful insight into its significance. Charles Darwin revealed a lot about
the natural world studying physical traits that survive. In my research I have recognized surviving
cultural elements and given them one more critical look to see what they might yet reveal and
predict about the world as well as the folks who preserve them.

5

Although many contemporary folklorists have begun to address this concern, little attention has been paid to myth
in this regard.
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Hufford viewed his interdisciplinary experience-centered approach “as a stage of
investigation that largely precedes theoretical interpretation…” (Hufford 1982, xvii; my
emphasis). Although he recognized that no approach is or should be truly free of theory, by
keeping theory at a minimum he was able “to provide better raw material that may be of use to
analysts who subscribe to a variety of theoretical schools of thought” (Hufford 1982, xvii).
Similarly, my thesis (which is principally an introduction to my life’s work) identifies and
substantiates—by means of comparative methods, paradigmatic structuralism and symmetry
theory—a point of mutual interest and then presents a compelling platform for genuine
interdisciplinary dialogue regarding the shared phenomenon. With Hufford, I agree that, “the
primary theoretical statement of the experience-centered approach might be roughly summed up
as follows: some significant portion of traditional supernatural belief is associated with accurate
observations and interpreted rationally” (Hufford 1982, xvii). I also concur with him in
qualifying that this statement is neither meant to suggest that all beliefs are true nor be taken as
proof that they are true. Like Hufford, whether future analysis of the materials I am presenting
here lead to the reduction of supernatural beliefs to mere physical explanations or perhaps to the
discovery of supernatural realities which have effectively eluded the current instruments and
methods of scientific inquiry, this study is primarily “concerned with obtaining a better
description of those observations and processes of reasoning that are associated with a particular
kind of widely distributed supernatural belief [the mutually dependent nature of opposites as
prescribed in myth, in my case]” (Hufford 1982, xix).
In, Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth, Dundes brings together twenty-two
selected essays from the major contributors of each of the main schools of thought in myth theory
since the dawn of international folkloristics near the end of the nineteenth century. Through the
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works of William Bascom, Jan de Vries, James G. Frazer, Mircea Eliade, Bronislaw Malinowski,
C. G. Jung, and Claude Levi-Strauss, he takes us from the initial efforts of the historicgeographic (comparative method), myth-ritual, Freudian, Jungian; psychoanalytic, functionalist
and structuralist approaches to interpreting the genre of myth. While many of these methods are
still employed by individual scholars, folklore, as a discipline, has turned its attention to
performance-based folklore; folklore studied within the context of a specific event, process,
place, or group. Hufford opposes this trend, chiding,
Some folklorists have gone so far as to say that in the study of supernatural belief the
issue of whether a given belief is correct is irrelevant. Given the findings reported in this
present study6, I must consider this to be an overstatement. For some research questions
the actual connection between personal accounts and the objective facts of allegedly
related personal experience matters little; for example, ‘Why does this group enjoy
hearing this particular legend, regardless of their personal involvement in the events it
describes?’ But for other questions our ability to describe confidently the features of
related experience can be crucial; for example, ‘Why is a particular believed narrative
stable across time and space?’ (Hufford 1982, xi)
Despite the shift towards contextualized, performed folklore, Gregory Schrempp’s,
Magical Arrows: the Maori, the Greeks, and the Folklore of the Universe, is an example of how
the comparative method (particularly an interdisciplinary one) can still be applied in important
ways that interrelate universal elements of diverse narratives rather than over-generalize and
reduce them to mere bits of data—stripped of context and catalogued in some inexhaustible
index. Contemporary folklorist, Jay Mechling, also recognizes the need to examine folklore “at
the borders.” It is here, he asserts, we begin to “shift [our] gaze from the stable centers to the
dynamic peripheries of cultures [and disciplines7], those boundaries where differences meet and
new meanings are made” (Mechling 2010).

6

Referring specifically to his study of “the Old Hag” which will be properly introduced in chapter II of my thesis.
In a personal conversation with Dr. Mechling at the annual conference of the American Folklore Society October
14, 2010, he confirmed to me his underlying intent that this quote be generously applied to all boundaries; whether
cultural, disciplinary, concrete or abstract, meaning is always derived at crossroads.

7
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In specific response to contemporary developments in folklore, Hufford explains, there
exists “an unfortunate tendency in folklore studies to divide into academic factions seen as either
unrelated to one another or as necessarily in conflict. Such divisions are those found between
persons with a humanities emphasis and those with a social science footing, collectors as opposed
to theoreticians, and text-oriented versus context-oriented scholars” (Hufford 1982, xvii).
Hufford also recognized (as I do) that these types of fissures seem to exist within other
disciplines and between disciplines as well. He continues, “Whatever the source of this trend, the
resulting conflict is frequently expressed in new ways of doing things that are intended both to
show the shortcomings of and to replace competing approaches” (Hufford 1982, xvii). While
Hufford acknowledges that such arguments have their place and can lead to better understanding
and practices, it is his opinion that “at least in folklore, they have tended to be overdone”
(Hufford 1982, xvii). Hufford is not interested in his experience-centered approach replacing
other methods and in fact his own study extensively employs the language, methods and findings
of not only other folklorists but of scholars from disciplines (statistics, medicine and
psychophysiology) “rarely, if ever before associated with the study of folklore” (Hufford 1982,
xvii).
Recently, many scholars and scientists have begun to look beyond the confines of their
respective disciplines. Chapter seven of Humanistic geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan’s landmark work,
Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, is devoted to the discussion of what he calls,
“mythical space and place,” or myth as a construct of reality. Theoretical physicist, Fritof Capra,
in, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern
Mysticism considers the impending role of vernacular knowledge in elucidating and perhaps,
even guiding scientific research. Bio-chemist and historian, Alfred Tauber’s work, Science and
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the Quest for Meaning, His Holiness The Dalai Lama’s, The Universe in a Single Atom: The
Convergence of Science and Spirituality, and distinguished evolutionary biologist, Edward
Wilson’s opus, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, are also good examples of contemporary
efforts to understand science through the lens of tradition8 and conversely, tradition through the
lens of science.
While folklore is not readily associated with science, in his work, l’Origine de Tous les
Cultes, nineteenth century lawyer, mathematician, and professor of rhetoric, Charles Dupuis9
asserts, “La mythologie, dans son origine, est l’ouvrage de la science; la science seule
l’expliquera” (Santillana and von Dechend 1969, 230). (Mythology, in its origin, is the work of
science; science alone will explain it.) But can science alone explain myth? Might not science
profit from a sincere and rigorous response to myth as well? Nevertheless, as rational thought led
to scientific inquiry and an absolute confidence in objective observation and experimentation to
interpret the world, myth was first marginalized, then rejected, and eventually ignored by science.
Prior to Platonic philosophy, c. 450BCE, humans are thought to have been pre-rational, in
other words, the now opposing ideals of mythic and rational thought were at one time compatible
and uncontested. In the Republic, Plato bans myth and poetry from Athens, not because he thinks
they are erroneous or malevolent, but because he believes them to mislead mediocre minds. In
fact, Plato considers myth and poetry to be true, albeit allegorical, accounts of reality and
continues to ground his dialogues, even frame his arguments in terms of Greek mythology. At
least through Newton, European scientists were still trying to explain the biblical account of

8

Among the synonyms for tradition are: myth, folklore, belief, custom, ritual, and practice—for reasons that will be
evident later in my thesis, I want to maintain these nuances and implications here though my work will primarily
focus on myth.
9
Dupuis was a proponent of Max Müller’s theory of Solar Mythology which proposed that all myths are metaphors
for the sun and that through the corruption of language, the metaphors took on independent and inherently corrupted
meaning that must now in modern times be reconstructed by scholars in order to get at any given myth’s “true”
meaning. For obvious reasons, this method is no longer considered by folklorists.
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creation as found in Genesis, reflecting an ongoing incorporation of at least their own mythology
(Wilczek 2008, 13). However, the philosophical ideas of Bacon, Descartes and the like would
become grounds for science ultimately untying itself from folk belief and heading down a path of
reducing nature into its incontingent, deterministic parts. Pointedly, “The philosophical basis of
this rigorous determinism was the fundamental division between the I and the world introduced
by Descartes…” (Capra 2000, 57) effectively removing subjective experience and consequently
folk belief from the domain of science. Furthermore, by the nineteenth century, developments in
evolutionary biology also seemed to question the relevance of such narratives.
Ironically, as science and technology brought the sub-atomic realm into view during the
early part of the twentieth century, the weirdness of quantum activity seemed to defy logic,
inviting—if not welcoming—mysticism back to the table.10 In short, scientists found themselves,
unavoidably, in need of a binary or two-fold perspective if they ever hoped to explain and
ultimately reconcile this “new” and uncanny sub-atomic realm with the larger cosmos.
In my opinion, science—by closing its eyes to the value of myth—is unnecessarily
reinventing the wheel, and one-armed at that. Incidentally, some of the greatest scientific
breakthroughs in the past have been made by individuals who intentionally looked to traditional
ideas to inspire their scientific work. Goethe believed that “[s]cience arose from poetry… [and
hoped that] when times change the two can meet again on a higher level as friends” (Miller 1955,
42; my emphasis).11 Because creation narratives are one place where nearly all disciplines
intersect, I begin there, “In the beginning…” as it were.
In the process of having determined necessary opposition as prescribed in creation
narratives as the point of interest for my case study, I preliminarily considered a variety of sacred
10

My use of mysticism here will be fully explored in chapter II.
This statement given to William Miller as quoted in LIFE Magazine, May 2, 1955 can also be found at
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-10/opinion/op-9363_1_sup
11
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narratives—narratives “explaining how the world and man came to be in their present form”
(Dundes 1998, 1)—from both East and West and from “primitive” as well as “progressive”
cultures. I casually compared these ancient descriptions with modern existential narratives found
in the discourses of philosophy and science in search of paradigms; unifying themes and motifs
that persisted throughout the various traditional and contemporary accounts of creation. My
familiarity with the discourses of metaphysics and quantum mechanics coupled with the acumen
of cooperating experts in these disciplines allowed me to simultaneously investigate whether any
of the traditional archetypes found in folklore were also embodied in philosophy and physics.
My early hypothesis being: If sacred narratives are indeed “the expression of unobservable
realities in terms of observable phenomena” (Leach 1962, 34) then they will be patterned in
some meaningful way and as such, have the impetus to inform other disciplines. In other words,
if mythical accounts indeed disclose unseen realities, then myth will necessarily lend valuable
insight to the sciences which seek to understand those phenomena. What's more, considering that
our current understanding of the quantum realm actually requires the existence of unobservable
realities (Wilczek 2008, 33)—realities which the scientific method alone cannot fully address
(Eddington 1928, 258-260)—then some degree of reconciliation between science and myth
seems, not only critical, but imminent.
In chapter II, Interdisciplinarity, I outline and interrelate the concepts of methodological
symmetry presented by Hufford, dialogue as viewed by Heidegger and Plato and the relationship
between analysis and synthesis as well as logic and intuition according to Einstein, Bohr,
Heisenberg, Schrödinger and Dirac, in order to justify my interdisciplinary comparative analysis
of each of these disciplines’ take on irreducibly binary phenomena. While I have primarily
followed Hufford’s particular approach in my thesis, I wanted to demonstrate that similar
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attitudes towards interdisciplinarity persist within each discipline and that a person could have
reasonably started with any of the aforementioned methodologies in pursuing the phenomenon of
necessary opposition.12 Of interest here will be the way these interdisciplinary models were
derived in direct response to the multifarious—even paradoxical—nature of a specific
phenomenon each of these scholars or scientists were investigating: in the case of Hufford, the
Old Hag; Heidegger, the essence of thinking; Plato, Love; Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schrödinger and Dirac, the electron.
In chapter III, Necessary Opposition, I summarize what Lévi-Strauss, Strawson and Bohr
have supposed about necessary opposition. I distill and justify what I consider to be the
prevailing points of overlap where the ideas of Lévi-Strauss, Strawson and Bohr seem to
intersect.
In chapter IV, Consequences and Conclusions, I examine the notion of symmetry and the
utility of tertiary elements—the seemingly distinct aspects—of each argument to see if they can
be related to the other two in any productive ways that further enhance each discipline’s
description of existence and deepen the collective understanding of what I am suggesting may be
a single phenomenon whose distinct aspects have been isolated during the reductionary process
of each respective discipline.

12

That being said (and borrowing once again from Hufford), I will clarify that, “Because I hope this study will be of
interest to people in a variety of fields, I have tried to avoid excessively technical language. When this was not
possible, I have provided basic definitions and background information…I have sought however to keep this book
[thesis] from falling into special interest sections, each standing alone. The data and concepts from each portion are
necessary for the full understanding and appreciation of all others. I trust that the advantages of this integrative
approach outweigh any disadvantages. At any rate, the novelty that a psychologist [philosopher or physicist in this
case] will find in reading primarily folklore material or that a folklorist will experience in reading about laboratory
sleep studies [metaphysics and quantum theory in this case] may be a good thing in itself. (Hufford 1982, xxiii)
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CHAPTER II
INTERDISCIPLINARITY

Epistemology is the study of knowledge or understanding. Epistemology is concerned
with the nature and scope of knowledge and is also referred to as theory knowledge. It questions
what knowledge is and how it can be acquired.13 Each discipline has its own “rules” that dictate
how and what kind of questions may be asked and the acceptable methods by which we may
come to know the answers to those questions. Each of the following scholars in this chapter
found the limitations of their respective disciplines not only stifling and restrictive but
insufficient to adequately deal with the phenomena they were investigating and looked to the
methods, language and insights of other disciplines and traditions to illuminate their
understanding and augment their research. By soliciting the insights of various disciplines and
traditions, they were able to discern relationships and meaningful nuances that largely reconciled
the contradictions and inconsistencies they each encountered while approaching a complex
phenomenon from a single perspective only.
To fully develop the epistemological roots and branches of folklore, philosophy and
physics—while incredibly interesting and likely an indispensable component of developing the
work I have begun here—is admittedly beyond the scope of this project. My purpose at this point
is merely to demonstrate that there exists at least a branch of erudition within each discipline that
has recognized (as I do) the advantages of a more interdisciplinary approach to understanding
and interpreting the world. I include this vein of scholarship in my thesis in order to establish that
while interdisciplinary methods may not enjoy widespread contemporary acceptance or use,

13

http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ as well as, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
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these methods have been defensibly justified and meaningfully employed by significant scholars
from folklore, philosophy and physics both presently and formerly—even anciently.
Of interest here, is the way that Hufford, Heidegger, Plato and the big five of theoretical
physics (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger and Dirac) developed strikingly similar
approaches to addressing complex phenomena despite the fact they came from divergent
backgrounds, disciplines and eras and were likely either unaware of or uninterested in each
other’s research.14 Because these scholars came from distinct disciplines, it is easy to cue in on
the dissimilar aspects of their methods such as idiosyncratic terms and definitions from their
various training and assume that their approaches are like apples and oranges and therefore unrelatable. To facilitate the easy recognition of the common and relevant aspects of each of the
following methods to my particular study, I have identified three critical elements found in each
of the following methodologies. It is my hope that whether folklorists agree with Hufford;
whether philosophers agree with Heidegger or Plato; whether physicists agree with Einstein,
Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger and Dirac, or not, at least my diverse audience will find some
familiar ground on which to stand as I make my argument for examining folk belief from the
perspective of philosophy and physics (understanding myth) and conversely physics and
philosophy from the perspective of folk belief (myth as understanding).
The following three methods share at least these three elements despite the markedly
varied language and illustrations to which they appeal: 1) the following scholars unanimously
recognized that to reveal some aspect of a phenomenon from one perspective unavoidably and
simultaneously obscured other aspects inherent to that phenomenon; 2) they concluded that
multiple perspectives were compulsory and could only be derived from an interdisciplinary

14

However, Heidegger and these five physicists were working on the question of being around the same time and
were all drawing on Kantian and transcendental philosophy to some extent.

21

approach to the phenomena they studied; 3) they understood that such an approach must entail
non-hierarchical interdisciplinary discourse where both qualitative and quantitative methods
were valued and employed, that is, they recognized that at least some elements of subjective
experience are objectively real and as such potentially reliable and straightforward and likewise,
that at least some elements of objective experience are only subjectively or relatively real and as
such potentially inconsistent and misleading.

David Hufford on Methodological Symmetry and the Experiential Source Hypothesis
David Hufford’s methodological symmetry and the relationship he documented between
cultural and experiential sources that inform narratives set a precedence in contemporary
folkloristics in terms of recognizing the epistemological limitations of current trends in the
collection and interpretation of folklore and the advantages of involving other disciplines in
order to: 1) better explain folklore and 2) make folklore relevant and useful to other disciplines.
For this reason, I begin with a summary of his landmark work The Terror That Comes in the
Night: An Experience-Centered Study of Supernatural Assault Traditions. In this study, Hufford
examines a legend known in Newfoundland, Canada as “the Old Hag.” When Hufford began
studying Old Hag narratives, he “expected it to take only a few months and to result in a single
article.” As the project developed, he “came to realize gradually in the course of the work” that
the project required an entirely new approach. Yet, Hufford explains, “Only when I had
completed this book did I begin to see the outlines of what I now call the experience-centered
approach…” (Hufford 1982, x). In the process of collecting and analyzing Old Hag narratives,
Hufford continues, “The greatest challenge to explanation in such traditions is the question of
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why people believe that they or others have had such experiences.” Because recognizable15
accounts of Old Hag turned up throughout North America (and throughout the world since
ancient times) not just in Newfoundland where the legend is common, Hufford had to question
whether culture alone could explain what was clearly shaping up to be a phenomenological
experience that was occurring independently of any familiarity with the tradition. He deduced
that if a legend originated from a cultural source then one or more of the following would apply:
1) no first person accounts would exist; 2) they would be misinterpretations of ordinary events
caused by the influence of traditional beliefs; 3) they would be outright lies or errors of memory;
4) they would be the experiences of victims of a hoax; 5) they would be caused by fasting,
hallucinogens known to produce subjective experiences that vary cross-culturally and are shaped
by expectations; 6) they would be the experience of abnormal individuals whose psychotic
episodes were shaped by their cultural repertoire (Hufford 1982, 13-14). Since the Old Hag
accounts he collected and studied did not fit into any of these categories, Hufford concludes, “the
alternative to the cultural source hypothesis is what I call the experiential source hypothesis. This
hypothesis holds that the Old Hag tradition contains elements of experience that are independent
of culture…The experiential source hypothesis predicts that recognizable ‘Old Hag experiences’
will occur with some regularity without contact with the tradition.” whereas “The cultural source
hypothesis predicts instead that, in the absence of a cultural source, recognizable Old Hag attacks
will not occur any more frequently than any other dream…” (Hufford 1982, 15-16). Due to the
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By “recognizable” Hufford meant that for a particular experience to be considered the Old Hag, regardless of the
informant’s knowledge of the Old Hag belief, the experience must contain certain elements which Hufford presents
in terms of “primary features.” Hufford’s study disclosed four primary features: 1) subjective impression of
wakefulness; 2) immobility variously perceived (paralysis, restraint, fear of moving); 4) fear. Hufford’s work on the
Old Hag, which began in 1971 predates and arguably inspired the first scientific identification of the same
phenomenon—hypnogogic or hypnopompic sleep paralysis depending on the part of the sleep cycle in which one
awakens—by almost a decade. I include here the most comprehensive bibliography that I discovered regarding sleep
paralysis. Most of the foundational research on the subject is acknowledged here:
http://www.periodicparalysis.org/english/view.asp?x=541.
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frequency and distribution of irrefutably recognizable Old Hag narratives outside of
Newfoundland and among uninformed Newfoundlanders, Hufford was justified in claiming that
the narratives are primarily descriptions of a common supernatural16 experience that
Newfoundlanders had recognized as being unique and given a specific name—which,
incidentally, is more than a century of scientific psychological studies were able to do.
Referencing a recent scientific study17 that provided a reasonable explanation for the
disappearance of medieval Norse mermen sightings by treating the corroborating details within
those narratives as reliable data, Hufford notes, “[E]vents accurately observed and reasoning
properly carried out are in some cases central in the development and maintenance of folk belief,
even when the beliefs appear fantastic. Also, in such cases folk knowledge is sometimes well in
advance of scientific knowledge.” He continues, “Furthermore, an awareness of the roles of
observation and reason can be essential in answering important folklore questions. The mermen
example also indicates that such explanatory efforts should demonstrate a high degree of
correspondence with the details of the tradition in question” (Hufford 1982, xiii; my emphasis). I
will similarly argue that when employing traditional creation accounts as source material for the
scientific investigation of the creation and disposition of matter, similar precautions must be
taken to ensure potentially critical details are considered regardless of how incredulous the
beliefs seem to be.
While the scientists carrying out the mermen study applied a highly scientific approach to
explain a medieval legend (in truth they used folklore to develop an investigation designed to
better understand optical phenomena due to atmospheric conditions and inadvertently offered a
highly plausible explanation for the legend in the process), it was their attention to the details of

16
17

I am defining supernatural as, beyond current scientific understanding.
See In the Wake of Sea Serpents by Bernard Heuvelmans for more details of the study itself.
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that folk belief that produced a reasonable justification for a phenomenon that had rarely been
taken seriously outside of traditional Norse culture and revealed the tremendous accuracy with
which those stories were initially told and subsequently re-told. The study validated the notion
that despite plentiful variant details within the collected accounts, there remained a conservative
core of reliable common features. Testing this hypothesis, the scientists deliberately and
successfully solicited the legend to guide their study of optical phenomena. However, generally
speaking, in the postmodern era, science has superseded myth as being the definitive description
of reality and rarely even acknowledges much less consults tradition. Though Hufford celebrates
the mermen study as an example of science providing a meaningful explanation for a particular
tradition and perhaps validating folk belief generally, he feared that in a purely scientific
approach to folklore, “The folk belief would be explained away rather than explained” (Hufford
1982, xiv). For example, once Hufford realized he was dealing with something more robust than
a local urban legend, he noted, “The failure of the cultural source hypothesis to accommodate the
Old Hag data has made the present chapter [The Psychological Dis-Interpretation of the Old
Hag] the most difficult one in this book both to write and to explain…But if the source is not in
culture, both a source and a mechanism must be sought in psychology” (Hufford 1982, 115).
After discovering that psychology had not even acknowledged what he was calling “Old
Hag” as a real and distinct phenomenon, Hufford set out to understand why Old Hag had gone
unnoticed by science. He informs us, “Assuming the existence of a cultural source, psychologists
have…offered the Old Hag rigorous hospitality at best. The occasional firsthand Old Hag
account has been accounted for in a great variety of ways by a long series of authors. The effect
has been to explain the phenomenon away while discouraging the development of a thorough
description of it” (Hufford 1982, 116). One such author Hufford identifies as having
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inadvertently driven the Old Hag deeper into obscurity is psychoanalyst, biographer and former
apprentice of Freud, Ernest M. Jones. After discovering that no psychologist or psychiatrist had
ever used the term Old Hag in the way he was using it, Hufford recognized that he, “must first
connect the Old Hag with something that has been studied and discussed in print.” To do this,
Hufford turned his attention to psychology’s treatment of sleep phenomena. He focused on
Jones’ research extensively as it was the first conclusive work on sleep phenomena and because
of its resulting bias (according to Hufford) on future scholars and because its influence on the
numerous theories that followed was inexcusably adverse. Where did Jones go wrong? In
Hufford’s opinion, it was an error of taxonomy resulting from Jones’ “excessive reliance on
theory.” Because Jones, a student of Freud,
…was so certain of his theory and had so little regard for the traditions he
considered…the distinction between the theoretical and the empirical all but disappeared.
In his work, one can hardly distinguish the experiences themselves, when they are
presented at all, from their interpretations. The lack of scientific precision attributed to
popular thought is found here in academic disguise. Considering the breadth of his
scholarship and the quantity of information he assembled, it is truly regrettable that Jones
did not untangle more of what he found. But perhaps this failure is understandable given
his theory-laden approach and the lack of objective knowledge about sleep at the time he
wrote. (Hufford 1982, 134-135; my emphasis)
In summary, Hufford believed that psychologists’ failure to accurately classify sleep
phenomena and more specifically to distinguish “nightmare” from “bad dream” led to confusion
and ignorance of the Old Hag as a distinct phenomenon. What’s more, “each time this
assumption was made in print it became more difficult for subsequent researchers to consider
alternative possibilities” (Hufford 1982, 135). None of this is to say that Hufford did not
recognize the need for science to engage in the Old Hag discussion; in fact he considers the
narratives he collects to be “data” and borrows statistical models in an attempt to distinguish and
accurately classify the phenomenon. The fact that Hufford initially focusses on describing what
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Old Hag is not, is in direct line with Karl Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism18 which was
adopted by science as a governing feature of its present epistemology and is evidence of
Hufford’s interest in a genuinely integrated approach that attempts to legitimately disclose what
the Old Hag actually is.
Although Hufford’s intent was to speak specifically to the Old Hag legend with which he
worked exclusively, I would argue that Hufford’s methods and findings indirectly make a case
for creation narratives as well. For instance, based on Hufford’s reasoning, one can sensibly
argue that the existence of extensive motif indexes19 are evidence of the frequency and
distribution of myths (and folktales too for that matter) and suggest that creation narratives are
perhaps based in a common objective experience; that is to say, they comprise “elements of
experience that are independent of culture” (Hufford 1982, 15) and beg to be taken seriously,
even literally—at least to some extent. As with Old Hag narratives, despite culturally distinct
particulars, vestiges of an underlying recognizable and widespread core experience persist, even
wait to be addressed. In other words, though myths, generally speaking, are not considered
practical explanations for the creation and character of matter by postmodern western philosophy
and science, the recognizable motifs that make them translatable worldwide, throughout the ages,
and I would argue across disciplines, demand sincere attention and rigorous investigation.
Once again (as this kind of attitude is critical to the development of any truly
interdisciplinary mindset) despite the productivity of his experience-centered approach, Hufford
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Critical rationalists hold that scientific theories and any other claims to knowledge can and should be rationally
criticized, and (if they have empirical content) can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. Thus
claims to knowledge may be contrastingly and normatively evaluated. (http://www.iep.utm.edu/cr-ratio/ as well as,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_rationalism)
19
Although it must be noted that Hufford has concerns regarding the way existing motif indexes reduce complex
phenomena like the Old Hag beyond recognition, where it becomes classified under separate motifs such as witches
or paralysis. When this happens, he argues, integral attributes of the Old Hag phenomenon get held up next to other
examples not related to or compatible with the distinct experience that is the Old Hag.
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resists the temptation to see his method as being complete or definitive; rather he recognizes that
experience, particularly subjective experience is very tenuous ground. He cautions,
I present this approach as one that can be added to those already in use. I do not propose
that it should become the only way that folklorists [and I would add philosophers and
scientists] should study belief or that it should replace any specific alternatives, although
I do believe that it can substantially supplement many other strategies.
This approach recognizes the epistemological difficulties of focusing on experience,
especially when dealing with the materials of greatest interest in the folkloric study of
supernatural belief. Another’s experience is always a reconstruction to be inferred rather
than a ‘fact’ to be directly observed. The data the folklorist relies on for this
reconstruction consist largely of verbal accounts, and these are well known to be loaded
with sources of error; faulty memories; the creative process of oral tradition; the very
processes of perception, which are generally recognized to be influenced by expectation.
(Hufford 1982, x; my emphasis)
In short, Hufford recognizes the limitations of any one approach and endorses the use of various
methods (not just his own), both in and outside of folklore, to genuinely examine and describe
folk belief, maintaining that other approaches are viable, applicable and must be welcomed if we
are ever to unveil the manifold aspects of any given phenomenon.

Heidegger and Plato on Dialogue
Neither Martin Heidegger20 nor Plato claimed to use dialogue as their method per se.
However that they used it—Plato exclusively—is reason enough to illuminate this method which
two of the greatest philosophical minds found so useful—even necessary in their attempt to
describe what it means to exist. It is interesting that all of Heidegger’s writings are informative
narratives except for this, one of his last works, “Conversation on a Country Path about
Thinking” which is a conversation—a dialogue—between a scientist, a teacher and a scholar.
20
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is widely acknowledged to be one of the most original and important philosophers
of the 20th century. His thinking has contributed to such diverse fields as phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty),
existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse,
Habermas), psychology (Boss, Binswanger, Rollo May), and theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich). His critique of
traditional metaphysics and his opposition to positivism and technological world domination have been embraced by
leading theorists of postmodernity (Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard). (http://www.iep.utm.edu/heidegge/)
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Heidegger gives neither preface nor explicit justification for employing this “new” approach as
he nears the end of his philosophical musings in mortality, but there is much we can infer
regarding his possible motives by examining Plato’s use of dialogue and within Heidegger’s text
itself. As with Plato’s dialogues: 1) we are dropped into a conversation already in progress; 2)
Heidegger (like Plato) is not a participant in the conversation; 3) he is not even narrating some
actual or specific conversation as such; 4) he gives no accounting or explicit explanation for
employing this method.
Having identified how these two went about saying something, we must also infer the
why of it. What motivated these two philosophers to defer to dialogue and why do neither of
them explicitly account for it? Let’s consider the content and context of each dialogue. In
“Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking” from Discourse on Thinking as the title
indicates, Heidegger is discussing “thinking” or more specifically, he is probing for the “essence
of thinking” in order to shed light on the quintessential nature of man. In Lysis and Symposium,
Plato seeks to disclose the most essential—or greatest—good in order to cultivate human nature.
Of acute interest to me—and in my opinion what answers the why, is the way in which dialogue
permits each of these philosophers to address the relentless ambiguity and disconcerting
paradoxes that always accompany any discussion of the presumably inescapable binary aspect of
things.
I think Heidegger, after a lifetime of developing and defending his perspective,
recognized that Plato’s use of dialogue permitted him to fully develop many lines of thought
before settling on what is believed to be his opinion. For example, we can assume that when
Socrates speaks, we are also hearing the fully developed thoughts of Plato himself. I will also be
assuming that when we hear from other members of Plato’s dialogues that we are essentially
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listening to the prevailing notions of his day and the questions either Plato asked himself to
challenge his own thinking and/or the criticisms of others regarding his ideas about the world
and human nature. I would even argue that, like Plato’s dialogues, every aspect of Heidegger’s
work is intentional—infused with meaning. Why does the conversation take place on a country
path? Why does the conversation in Symposium occur in the dark of night and reach its climax
as the dawn breaks and the cock crows? Because meaning and enlightenment come at the
crossroads, where night becomes day, where disciplines and opinions collide and interrelate. The
country path is a winding road. Every dip and bend in the road offers a new perspective. It is
significant and no doubt intentional on Heidegger’s part that the conversation takes place not in
the scientist’s lab, not in the scholar’s office, nor in the teacher’s classroom, but on a country
path. Whatever his intentions may have been, he leaves it for us to infer and, yes, I would assert,
that too is intentional on his part.
Heidegger follows Husserl’s21 lead in developing a perspective that would transcend the
two prevailing opposing camps of their day, the empirical scientific realism of the positivists22

21

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a mathematician, physicist and philosopher. He completed his doctorate
dissertation on the theory of the calculus of variations before completing another degree in philosophy where he
considered the philosophy of arithmetic. Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations) was published in two
parts, and is an introduction to his concept of phenomenology. In 1913 he published the quintessential piece, Ideas:
A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, introducing his phenomenological reduction — an intuitive method
of contemplating objects while observing the meanings and reflections the mind deploys to describe them. Due to
the nature of such reflection, the object of contemplation need not be physically present; for Husserl the method
involves the setting aside of real existence and concerning oneself with the "bracketing of existence," or the
observing of what it means that something appear as a true phenomenon within “the objective world”. These studies
led Husserl to conceive and analyze detailed descriptions of mental structures involved in the perception of objects.
Husserl came to the conclusion that consciousness requires an object for contemplation; it is a descriptive discipline
that should strive for the description of “things in themselves,” as opposed to the invention of theories.
(http://www.egs.edu/library/edmund-husserl/biography/)
22
Logical Positivism is a position propagated by the Vienna Circle (1922) that insists: The only meaningful
philosophical problems are those that can be solved by logical analysis (elementary propositions that are either
tautological—true in every possible interpretation—or empirically verifiable). As such, logical positivism rejected
metaphysics, theology and sometimes ethics as meaningless.
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and the noumenal realism of Kant.23 Borrowing from the Greek word, alethia or Truth,
Heidegger describes essential truth as being so ripe with meaning—potential, intention, relative
perspectives—that any attempt to disclose some aspect of its essence would necessitate a
simultaneous concealment of some other aspect of itself. In this way, Heidegger avoids
“either/or” arguments by providing a framework in which two opposing notions of reality are
both “correct” and yet neither are absolutely “True.” Furthermore Heidegger will have said that
insomuch as correct statements regarding a given phenomenon contradict one another, we have
not yet understood the true nature of that phenomenon or as Hufford discovered with the Old
Hag, we have misclassified it.
I believe it is for this reason Heidegger employs the various perspectives of Scientist,
Teacher and Scholar in “Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking.” The dialogue opens
with the scientist being concerned about the teacher’s statement—a statement which is not given
by the way—concerning man’s nature not being a question about man (Heidegger 1966, 52). For
the scientist, this is perplexing and impossible because he recognizes only those aspects of man
which are observable and measurable. Indeed, if left to our common sensory apparatus, we must
look to man to disclose this particular aspect of what a man actually is. The teacher however is
concerned with a more rigorous inquiry and challenges, “I only said that the question concerning
man’s nature makes a consideration whether this is the case unavoidable” (Heidegger 1966, 52;
my emphasis). In other words the teacher is merely suggesting that to consider the nature of
anything we must examine what is there when we aren’t looking as well as what we observe
when we are looking at it. In the next line, the scientist gives the teacher that much by
acknowledging, “Even so,” showing his regard for at least the consideration of there being more
23

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the most influential philosophers of all time, is best known for his landmark
work The Critique of Pure Reason which contributed significantly to Western notions of metaphysics and
epistemology. His work influenced nearly every philosophical movement that followed him.
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to man’s nature than meets the eye, but goes on to say, “it is a mystery to me how man’s nature
is ever to be found by looking away from man.” demonstrating the general disinterest and
mistrust science holds for the mysterious. The teacher, on the other hand, embraces the
complexity as a necessary step towards any kind of real understanding about the actual nature of
man not just what appears or seems to our senses to be our nature. The teacher understands that
everything must have at least two aspects, the seen and unseen aspects which make up the whole.
And so the teacher responds to the scientist, “It is a mystery to me too; so I seek to clarify how
far this is possible,” in other words, yes it’s a mystery which is precisely why it demands our
attention to whatever degree possible. Then he adds, not only must we “seek to clarify how far
this is possible,” but also how far this may be necessary (Heidegger 1966, 52; my emphasis).
The scientist is outraged at the paradox, “To behold man’s nature without looking at man!” To
this the teacher simply replies, “Why not?” George Bernard Shaw, in his work Back to
Methuselah: A Metabiological Pentateuch said, “I hear you say, ‘Why?’ Always, ‘Why?’ You
see things; and you say, ‘Why?’ But I dream things that never were; and I say ‘Why not?’”
(Shaw 1946, 6).
Ironically, the premier scientific icon of our era, Albert Einstein, seems to concur with
the teacher in saying, “The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious—the
fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science” (Einstein 1949, 7;
my emphasis). In this lies the strength of phenomenology. Rather than privileging either the
“known” or the “unknown” it permits us to examine the relationship between these two aspects
or the know-ing we could say. Lao Tzu, in the Tao Te Ching XLII, effectively describes this kind
of relational ontology, “The Tao [or we could say Alethia, Truth or that which is most essential]
begets One; one begets two; two begets three; three begets all things. All things carry the yin on
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their front and the yang on their back and are harmonized by the immaterial breath (ch’i) (Perry
1971, 23). This idea of one aspect being before us or within our view and the other aspect being
at our backs—out of view but nevertheless there—is useful and is enhanced by Heidegger’s
notion of disclosure and concealment.
Socrates’ closing remarks in the Symposium are of interest here. After determining Love
to be the most essential being in existence and a long night of drinking and attempting to disclose
the nature of Love from the various perspectives of each man present, by dawn all have fallen
asleep or left except Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates. Aristodemus wakes just as the dawn
was about to break. He finds the three drinking and Socrates talking to them though,
Aristodemus couldn’t remember exactly what they were saying—he’d missed the first
part of their discussion, and he was half-asleep anyway—but the main point was that
Socrates was trying to prove to them that authors should be able to write both comedy
and tragedy: the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic poet. He was about to
clinch the argument, though, to tell the truth, sleepy as they were, they were hardly able
to follow his reasoning. In fact, Aristophanes fell asleep in the middle of the discussion,
and very soon thereafter, as day was breaking, Agathon also drifted off. (Cohen, Curd
and Reeve 2005, 330)
And so the seemingly anticlimactic closing paragraph of the Symposium puts us to sleep as well
unless we really consider what Socrates was trying to say. It has been said that tragedy
demonstrates the smallness of the individual in light of the universal or divine perspective,
whereas comedy demonstrates the smallness of the universal in relation to the individual
perspective. So what is the significance of only the comedian, and the tragedian being still awake
for Socrates’ concluding remarks? I think Socrates was trying to illustrate that to understand
what is most essential we must view both the universal and particular aspects of the world
together. That to view one aspect in isolation necessarily conceals the other. I would further
suggest that this is the reason Plato and Heidegger employ dialogue as a means of dropping into
a multiplicity of correct perspectives at once thereby holding up multiple and varied disclosures
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alongside each other and allowing a “mysterious” understanding to somehow emerge from the
relationship between the various conversations. As I mentioned in the introduction, Plato bans
myth and poetry from Athens in the Republic, not because he thinks they are erroneous or
malevolent, but because he believes them to mislead mediocre minds. In fact, Plato considers
myth and poetry to be true, albeit allegorical, accounts of reality.
I would further argue, that Plato was seeking a balance between myth and logic; that
because the pendulum had swung so far to the left, he was emphasizing philosophy as a shift
towards the right but never really intended to do away with the less visible poetry on our backs
so much as he wanted to draw attention to the world in plain view before us. I would also suggest
that the pendulum had come full right in postmodern western thinking and that Heidegger and
others were essentially making a shift towards the left in search of a more balanced perspective.
Throughout Lysis and Symposium this theme is presented continuously and indeed seems
to be the point Plato is trying to make. I have mentioned only a few examples to demonstrate
how this notion of relational ontology is found throughout Plato’s work and how liberally he
applies it to almost every conversation. Underlying Lysis and Symposium is the question of how
we may come to know anything. Lysis is a quest to discover how love works whereas the
Symposium concerns itself with illuminating the nature of love. In both cases, many logical and
“correct” notions are presented but because the objective is to get at the Truth of the matter and
not just to be “right” they must reach beyond the limitations of rhetoric and logic and seek a
different kind of knowing to guide their conversations. The Greeks recognized two types of
thinkers, elengchein, someone who questions and probes to get at what is actually true—Socratic
elenchus—and eristikos, someone who practices the sort of argument that aims at scoring points
against an opponent, rather than discovering the truth (Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2005, 525-527). It
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goes without saying that Heidegger, like Plato was more interested in getting at the truth than
simply being right. In the memorable words of the fictional character Lord Frith (the sun god
from Richard Adam’s 1972 story book Watership Down), “What is, is what must be.”
In Lysis, there is an argument, based in human experience and opinion that to love is to
be loved back, something we have all experienced in some way and know to be a “correct”
statement, but is it “true” becomes the question. “So there are no horse-lovers unless the horses
love them back…and no wine-lovers, or exercise-lovers. And no lovers of wisdom, unless
wisdom [itself] loves them in return” (Reeve 2006, 12; my emphasis). Then comes the
contradiction—which is also “correct” and equally supportable by human experience—and yet
“…one is frequently a friend of a non-friend…” (Reeve 2006, 13). To these contradictions
Socrates responds, “I think you are right, Lysis, to say that if we were looking at things in the
right way, we wouldn’t be so far off course. Let’s not go in that direction any longer. That line of
inquiry looks like a rough road to me. I think we better go back to where we turned off, and look
for guidance to the poets, the ancestral voices of human wisdom.” Socrates then asks Lysis if he
thinks the ancient philosophers and poets were right in their reasoning about nature and the
universe, to which Lysis replies, “Maybe.” Socrates’ next response is significant, “Maybe half of
it…maybe even all of it, but we don’t understand it. To our way of thinking,” (Reeve 2006, 14;
my emphasis) it seems implausible. In Symposium, Dionysus24 instructs us that to be truly
conscious we must become drunk, that to obtain wisdom we must be mad. In “Conversation on a
Country Path about Thinking,” Heidegger calls it a “releasement” from our willful judgments or

24
Dionysus is the god of the grape harvest, winemaking, wine, of ritual madness, fertility, theatre and religious
ecstasy in Greek mythology and later considered a patron of the arts. He invented wine and spread the art of tending
grapes. He has a dual nature, on the one hand bringing joy and divine ecstasy, on the other brutal, unthinking rage.
He is the only god to have a mortal parent. When an angry Hera tricks Zeus into killing Dionysus’ mother, Zeus
manages to rescue the fetus, stitching Dionysus into his thigh to hold him until he was ready to be born. By virtue of
being born of Zeus, alone, he is immortal and therefore a god rather than a demi-god.
(http://www.greekmythology.com/Other_Gods/Dionysus/dionysus.html)
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a “letting-be” which he describes as active passivity or we could say a mindful mindlessness
rather than common apathy (Heidegger 1966, 53).
In his work, Lysis, Plato on Love, C.D. Reeve—in true Heideggerian fashion I might
add—looks at the etymology behind Socrates’ claim to knowing the Art of Love. “The only
thing I say to know,” Socrates tells us in Symposium, “is ta erotica” (177d8-9). What is he
claiming to know? (neuter plurals imply “the art or craft of” like ta phusika (physics) and ta
politika (statesmanship) [so] …the noun eros (love) and the verb erotan (to ask questions) seem
to be etymologically connected—something explicitly mentioned in Cratylus (398c5-e5).
Socrates knows about the art of love [or anything for that matter] in that—but just insofar as—he
knows how to ask questions, how to converse elenctically (Reeve 2006, xix-xx). Furthermore, in
Lysis, Socrates informs us about this critical aspect of thinking and knowing as he cautions,
“Those who are already wise no longer love wisdom (philosophein), whether they are gods or
men. Nor do those who are so ignorant that they are bad, for no bad and stupid man loves
wisdom. There remain only those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been
made ignorant and stupid by it. They are conscious of not knowing what they don’t know (Reeve
2006, 19), reiterating Heidegger’s concepts of “releasement” and “letting-be.” Students of
Heidegger would further develop this notion distinguishing the know-ing from the known and
the see-ing from the seen.
Though the scientist in Heidegger’s “Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking” is
at first almost hostile regarding any kind of serious investigation into that which is not “present,”
he comes to realize that to “look” at these other aspects of man’s nature entirely, requires us to
“look away” if we are to see the subjective reality behind an object and not be distracted by its
more obvious characteristics. Ultimately he comes to realize the limitations of scientific inquiry
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alone and recognizes that what is required is a “non-willing in the sense of a renouncing of
willing [it is not clear what Heidegger intended by ‘willing’ but within this context we could say
‘remove preconceived judgments and expectations’ so far as it is possible to do so], so that
through this we may release, or at least prepare to release, ourselves for the sought-for essence of
thinking that is not a willing” (Heidegger 1966, 52-53). With great enthusiasm the scientist
confesses, “Ever more openly I am coming to trust in the inconspicuous guide who takes us by
the hand—or better said, by the word—in this conversation” (Heidegger 1966, 53). And later, the
scientist, almost intoxicated and bewildered confides, “In many respects it is clear to me…But at
the same time, I know less and less…” and later when the teacher asks if he has forgotten what
he had said in an earlier conversation, he replies, “Forgetfulness does seem to be an especial
danger in such conversations.” reiterating once again this idea of a necessary state of forgetfulawareness.
While I am certain that these ideas require further development, I hope that I have at least
brought forth compelling corollaries between the methods and insights of Plato and Heidegger
and shown how their view of the world is essential to any meaningful epistemological endeavor
regardless of discipline, culture, or faith. In other words, whether we are considering Love-Strife,
Myth-Science, Mind-Matter, Rhyme-Reason, the ordinary senses only perceive the Yin on our
fronts. Finer sensibilities and diverse methods are required to disclose the more ambiguous yang
on our backs. In this way, Heidegger and Plato, together with Hufford seem to regard an
interdisciplinarity approach to understanding the nature of existence integral.

Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger and Dirac on Analysis and Synthesis; Logic and
Intuition
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While Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger and Paul
Dirac25 are typically recognized for their various descriptions of the nature and disposition of
matter, in this chapter, I will be focusing primarily on the collective philosophy they developed
in order to begin to unlock the secrets of the atom and to somewhat satisfy the breach between
classical and quantum descriptions of nature. Since the point of my thesis is to justify an
operative interdisciplinary model where scholars from all disciplines might engage in meaningful
discourse that illuminates the multifarious aspects of necessary opposition—in effect, a dialogue
that enlarges each discipline’s description of what it means to exist—I will only include enough
of their ideas to establish that, while science generally does not look to tradition (and only
cursorily to philosophy) as a viable resource, there indeed exist noteworthy scientific scholars
who have adopted comparable approaches to binary phenomena as Hufford, Heidegger and Plato
did. To be specific, I will be including only these scientists’ ideas on: 1) the simultaneous
“disclosure and concealment” of studied phenomenon; 2) an integrated approach to
understanding atomic structure; 3) the utility—even necessity—of intuition and the inherent
limitations of logic in scientific discovery.
Though these scientists did not agree on every point and indeed drew various
conclusions, they generally agreed that the insights of many (if not all) disciplines and traditions
were requisite to even approach the seemingly mystical relationship between the two opposing
aspects of the electron—though each aspect was straightforward when considered independently.
In other words, the problem of the electron demanded analysis and synthesis, logic and intuition
in order to disclose the electron’s (conventionally considered as matter) or light’s
(conventionally seen as energy) unavoidably two fold nature. In fact, when electrons or light are
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These men are five of the first and most notable theoretical physicists who helped define and develop the field
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
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passed through a barrier with a single slot against a backdrop, there will be a corpuscular
(particular) signature. However, if the same electrons or light are passed through the same barrier
with two slots against the same backdrop, there will be an undulatory (wavelike) signature. Faced
with such a paradox, these scientists found themselves apparently beyond the confines of logic
and in need of metaphysical insight. The prevailing notion in the science of their day that had
made “objective” experiment the authority had been fundamentally challenged by the ambiguous
character of the electron itself, in that the condition of the electron seemed to depend on the very
instruments of experiement and observation.
Heisenberg explains, “Science no longer is in the position of observer of nature, but
rather recognizes itself as part of the interplay between man and nature. The scientific method
[itself]... changes and transforms its object: the procedure can no longer keep its distance from
the object.” (Heisenberg 1960, 231) and on another occasion, “…separation of the observer from
the phenomenon to be observed is no longer possible” (Scully 2007, 3). The conundrum of the
electron’s seemingly dual nature led Heisenberg, Bohr (although Bohr would later alter the very
definition of “phenomena” and “experiment” in order to maintain a more positivist footing) and
others (indeed the majority of present-day quantum physicists) to what would be called the
Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s interpretation essentially
concedes that sub atomic particles (and light) are both a wave of energy and a particle at once (or
we could say neither a wave of energy nor a particle); that their existence is observer dependent.
This condition means that when we attempt to observe a particle’s location in space, its velocity
cannot be accurately predicted and likewise, if one measures a particle’s velocity, its location can
no longer be reliably predicted. Heisenberg asserts, “The conception of objective reality ... has
thus evaporated ... into the transparent clarity of mathematics that represents no longer the
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behavior of particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior” (Popper 1992, 85; my
emphasis). While Heisenberg and Bohr are aligned on the fundamental uncertainty (although
Bohr later avoids this terminology) of the electron in space and time, Schrödinger and Einstein
reject this interpretation and insist on a more determinate scheme where the electron can be
explained (at least in some possible physics) in terms of space-time, meanwhile Dirac seems
rather disinterested and puts his “faith” in mathematical “beauty” as the guiding principle that
would eventually lead to a complete understanding of atomic processes, all of which will be
elaborated in the following paragraphs which I have dedicated specifically to each man’s
comments on the matter.
Despite considerable variation in the details of their opinions, I will be considering the
theoretical physicists of the turn of the twentieth century as a folk group.
“What Is Folklore?” Dundes disputes the notion that “folk” should be automatically
identified with peasant or rural groups, or with people from the past. He argues that
contemporary urban people also have folklore and suggests that rather than dying out,
folklore is constantly being created and recreated to suit new situations. (Dundes, 1965,
2) Dundes defines folk group as “any group of people whatsoever who share at least one
common factor.” (Dundes 1965, 2) It does not matter what the linking factor is—it could
be a common occupation, language, or religion-but what is important is that a
group...have some traditions that it calls its own. (Dundes, 1965, 2) Oring (1984) reduced
even further the size of the potential folk group by showing how rich can be the folk
culture of a high-context dyad, a folk group consisting of only two [or very few] people.
(Mechling 2006, 435)
I assert that these men, though widely dispersed across the globe in a time when both travel and
communication were slow, developed a common language, culture and an essentially common
view of the world. I will also be considering the following quotes26 as a collection of the folk
belief of this group. Many of the quotes are from letters27 which can only be considered as
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I acquired many of the aforementioned quotes from http://todayinsci.com/home.htm before confirming them in
printed sources.
27
See Jennifer Eastman Atteberry’s work on immigrant letters, Up in the Rocky Mountains, which establishes
correspondence as a form of folklore.
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conversations between the members of this widely dispersed folk group. These personal
narratives and memorates, which have indeed become part of the collective narrative of that folk
group even today, must be seen as at least somewhat comparable to the informal interactions of
more traditional folk groups. Nearly all of the quotes are from either their personal reflections or
as remembered and recorded by another member of the folk group. As with all folk belief there
are both conservative and dynamic elements. While I will be focusing primarily on the
conservative elements which align with my declared thesis, I will also provide some relevant
commentary regarding the dynamic elements or the points at which their beliefs diverge. The
reasons for this include; avoiding over-generalizing their work and a purpose (the utility of
dynamic elements when we assume symmetry) which will become clearer in the chapters to
follow. With that said, I will now present their respective accounts of disclosure and
concealment, the compulsory integration of various disciplines and traditions and the utility and
necessity of subjective experiences such as intuition and beauty in order to determine and
describe atomic processes.
Werner Heisenberg specifically, in his 1958 Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in
Modern Science, addresses the suitability of an integrated approach to scientific discovery
acknowledging,
It is probably true quite generally that in the history of human thinking the most fruitful
developments frequently take place at those points where two different lines of thought
meet. These lines may have their roots in quite different parts of human culture, in
different times or different cultural environments or different religious traditions: hence if
they actually meet, that is, if they are at least so much related to each other that a real
interaction can take place, then one may hope that new and interesting developments may
follow. (Haisch, 2009, 160)
In addition to drawing on other insights he also admits (as mentioned earlier) the
inadequacy of the scientific method alone to describe nature, conceding,
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What we observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning.
Our scientific work in physics consists in asking questions about nature in the language
that we possess and trying to get an answer from experiment by the means that are at our
disposal. (Heisenberg 1958, 78; my emphasis)
The use of “nature itself” will become important in the following chapters. For now I merely
draw attention to Heisenberg’s belief that what we observe is not nature itself. Einstein often
puzzled, “but what is there when we are not looking?” Incidentally, the correlation between this
kind of rationale and the teacher’s initial query in Heidegger’s Conversation on a Country Path
about Thinking is self-evident and will be further explored later in this thesis.
In an earlier paper in 1949, Heisenberg expresses the inadequacy of language (common
or scientific) to describe what nature is doing at the atomic level. He believes mathematics is the
language best suited to describe the fundamentally binary processes of the atom. While
traditional accounts of nature defer to metaphor and analogy rather than mathematics, I would
argue the reasoning is the same. Heisenberg explains the confines of language and the way that
mathematics (like allegories) provide an alternative “vocabulary” that make, at least, an abstract
description of reality possible,
It is not surprising that our language should be incapable of describing the processes
occurring within the atoms, for, as has been remarked, it was invented to describe the
experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving exceedingly large
numbers of atoms. Furthermore, it is very difficult to modify our language so that it will
be able to describe these atomic processes, for words can only describe things of which
we can form mental pictures, and this ability, too, is a result of daily experience.
Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has been possible to
invent a mathematical scheme—the quantum theory—which seems entirely adequate for
the treatment of atomic processes; for visualization, however, we must content ourselves
with two incomplete analogies—the wave picture and the corpuscular picture.
(Heisenberg 1949, 11)
In a letter to Albert Einstein, Heisenberg unapologetically admits the allure of beauty and
simplicity as reliable indicators of fundamental truth,
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You may object that by speaking of simplicity and beauty I am introducing aesthetic
criteria of truth, and I frankly admit that I am strongly attracted by the simplicity and
beauty of mathematical schemes which nature presents us. You must have felt this too:
the almost frightening simplicity and wholeness of the relationship, which nature
suddenly spreads out before us. (Stewart 2007, 278)
Finally, in reference to the unfathomable ‘properties’ of the electron, Heisenberg makes a
comment of profound interest, especially in light of Malson’s previously stated definition of
myth being “the expression of unobservable realities in terms of observable phenomena.” (Leach
1962, 34) Heisenberg, in a rather matter-of-fact tone informs us,
It seems sensible to discard all hope of observing hitherto unobservable quantities, such
as the position and period of the electron…. (Kragh 1999, 161; my emphasis)
Suggesting once again that an abstract glimpse of these “unobservable” realities by means of
pure mathematics and the theoretical narrative they provide are perhaps our only hope of
conceptualizing how the electron exists.
In reference to Heraclitus’28 “world in common,” Erwin Schrödinger—father of wave
mechanics—believed that this world in common is discovered through observation in
combination with insights of a metaphysical nature—hunches, spontaneous creative thought, and
the like—that guide the interpretation of the observations. He also believed that the only way to
achieve a complete world picture is to take account of nonscientific as well as scientific
knowledge; that to obtain a comprehensive view of the world, one requires the union of all
knowledge, the insights achieved in all disciplines.29

28

Heraclitus (c. 540-480BC) was a pre-Socratic ancient Greek philosopher who perceived that all things share a
common origin in what he calls logos which for Heraclitus is evidently a kind of voice or vibration of some kind.
“This logos holds always but humans always prove unable to understand it, both before hearing it and when they
have first heard it. For though all things come to be [or, happen] in accordance with this logos, humans are like the
inexperienced when they experience such words and deeds as I set out, distinguishing each in accordance with its
nature and saying how it is…For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common. But although the logos is
common, most people live as if they had their own private understanding.” (Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2005, 25)
29
http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/chap1.htm
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In regards to incorporating all insights into a comprehensive framework (and in
opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation or probability theories generally), Schrödinger
explains in a letter to Willy Wien30 August 25, 1926,
Physics does not consist only of atomic research, science does not consist only of
physics, and life does not consist only of science. The aim of atomic research is to fit our
empirical knowledge concerning it into our other thinking. (Moore 1989, 226)
For Schrödinger, all thinking must form a comprehensible unity. While the folks in
Copenhagen were satisfied with a non-deterministic model, Schrödinger preferred to think of all
inconsistencies (the dual nature of the quantum, spontaneous generation, evolution and so on) in
nature as the intersecting of causal chains. In fact, it becomes clear in his book Meine
Weltansicht which was published after his death, the extent to which he was influenced by his
study of Vedanta.31 Through this traditional lens and inspired by the ideas of Max Delbruck,32 in
1944 Schrödinger writes a book titled What is life? where he suggests that similarly to quantum
mechanics, heredity too must be a case of “order-from-disorder”. In this way, he is able to make
several seemingly counterintuitive assumptions such as, the mechanism responsible for heredity
must contain a small number of atoms and be persistent across time—a description which cannot
be explained by classical physics but relies on a quantum understanding of micro-biological
processes. Relating the quantum conception of the diffusion of particles in a solution, to
mutation, he suggests that genes, if viewed as a molecule comprised of aperiodic crystals, allow
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Wilhelm Carl Werner Otto Fritz Franz Wien (1864-1928) was a German physicist who used theories about heat
and electromagnetism to deduce Wien’s displacement law, which calculates the emission of a blackbody at any
temperature from the emission at any one reference temperature. He also formulated an expression for the blackbody
radiation which is correct in the photon-gas limit. His arguments were based on the notion of adiabatic invariance
and were instrumental for the formulation of quantum mechanics. Wien received the 1911 Nobel Prize for his work
on heat radiation. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Wien)
31
“The goal of Vedanta is for the seeker to have the direct experience of his or her true nature…Vedanta also
teaches that we are all members of a single family and that our differences are merely superficial.”
(http://vedantadc.org/what-is-vedanta)
32
According to Delbrück’s model, quantum physics made it possible to understand general persistence as well as the
case of spontaneous mutation. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_Life%3F)
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a small number of atoms to encode a nearly infinite number of possibilities. Schrödinger’s
interdisciplinary work “was an inspiration to the first of the molecular biologists, and has been,
along with Delbruck himself, credited for directing the research during the next decade that
solved the mystery of how ‘like begat like’33” (Mullis 1997, 103).
In his new universal epistemology, Schrödinger also ventures into a philosophy of
psychology as well, describing the knowing individual subject and the object of our individual
knowledge as being a single, fundamentally irreducible, complementary real unit. He insists,
The world is given to me only once, not one existing and one perceived. Subject and
object are only one…[Explaining] Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical
terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms
of anything else… [He continues,] The world is a construct of our sensations,
perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But
it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. (Schrödinger 1967, 11)
While Schrödinger insists on the reality of the subjective experience in space and time, he is in
no way suggesting that objective reality is an illusion. He recognized that any serious
investigation of the nature of existence demands a sincere dialogue with all disciplines,
especially those that specifically address “subjective” experience.
In a letter to Einstein written June 13, 1946 regarding the way the uncertainty principle
would conceal or at least undermine the actual description of existence by altering our idea of
what is knowable, Schrödinger chides,
I am no friend of probability theory; I have hated it from the first moment when our dear
friend Max Born gave it birth. For it could be seen how easy and simple it made
everything, in principle, everything ironed and the true problems concealed. Everybody
must jump on the bandwagon [Ausweg]. And actually not a year passed before it became
an official credo, and it still is.34

33
34

Referring to Watson and Crick’s discovery of the double helix molecule structure of which DNA is comprised.
http://politicalquotes.org/node/62190
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Schrödinger also enjoyed drawing attention to examples of ancient wisdom preceding
scientific discovery and admitting the limitations of common logic and alleged objective
perception, pointing out things like,
Plato was the first to envisage the idea of timeless existence and to emphasize it—against
reason—as a reality, more [real] than our actual experience…. (Scully 2007, 3)
One of Paul Dirac’s most beloved anecdotes which he often shared regarding the
propensity of pure mathematics was the way Schrödinger’s original equations describing the
wave model of quantum mechanics accounted for the spin of the electron, something unknown at
the time he “discovered” the equation. Though it seemed to Schrödinger to be a discrepancy for
which he actually developed a solution, in truth his equation instinctively described a specific
aspect of the electron unbeknownst (to borrow Lévi-Strauss’ expression) to him—or anyone else
for that matter—at the time.
Niels Bohr, in the Introduction to International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Vol. 1
entitled Analysis and Synthesis in Science, outlines the role of interdisciplinary scholarship this
way,
Notwithstanding the admittedly practical necessity for most scientists to concentrate their
efforts in special fields of research, science is, according to its aim of enlarging human
understanding, essentially a unity. Although periods of fruitful exploration of new
domains of experience may often naturally be accompanied by a temporary renunciation
of the comprehension of our situation, history of science teaches us again and again how
the extension of our knowledge may lead to the recognition of relations between formerly
unconnected groups of phenomena, the harmonious synthesis of which demands a
renewed revision of the presuppositions for the unambiguous application of even our
most elementary concepts. This circumstance reminds us not only of the unity of all
sciences aiming at a description of the external world but, above all, of the in-separability
of epistemological and psychological analysis. It is just in the emphasis on this last point,
which recent development in the most different fields of science has brought to the
foreground, that the present great undertaking distinguishes itself from that of previous
encyclopedic enterprises, in which stress was essentially laid on the completeness of the
account of the actual state of knowledge rather than on the elucidation of scientific
methodology. It is therefore to be hoped that the forthcoming Encyclopedia will have a
deep influence on the whole attitude of our generation which, in spite of the ever
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increasing specialization in science as well as in technology, has a growing feeling of the
mutual dependency of all human activities. Above all, it may help us to realize that even
in science any arbitrary restriction implies the danger of prejudices and that our only way
of avoiding the extremes of materialism and mysticism is the never ending endeavor to
balance analysis and synthesis. (Bohr 1998, 92-93; my emphasis)
To avoid unnecessary repetition I am limiting Bohr’s comments here specifically to the questions
of interdisciplinarity and disclosure and concealment as contained in this one quote. Because of
the alleged inconsistencies in his opinions over time and because his philosophy of necessary
opposition will be addressed forthwith, I will reserve his notion of complementarity and its
bearing on existence and the reality of experience for chapter III.
Paul Dirac was initially training to be an engineer before discovering the overwhelming
predisposition for pure mathematics that eventually led him to theoretical physics and the
legendary contributions he would make there. However, as an engineering student, he developed
an uncanny ability to mentally conceptualize and manipulate objects spatially with great ease and
enjoyment. It wasn’t until he arrived at Cambridge that he developed an interest in philosophy
and the emerging field of quantum physics. Upon publication of Einstein’s papers in 1905, Dirac
felt desperate to understand step by step how Einstein arrived at his theory of special relativity.
When no technical account was to be found he was obliged to look to philosophy, as the bulk of
commentary on the theory was being discussed predominately in terms of philosophy. This was
the first time Dirac had given any attention to philosophy or tradition but this experience and a
later course in ancient Greek philosophy—particularly the pre-Socratics and their idea of
beauty35 being truth—seems to have set Dirac on an undeviating course in search of “beautiful”
mathematics that would guide and typify his work from his early twenties until he passed away
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Pythagoreans believed there to be a strong correlation between beauty and truth and Plato viewed beauty as the
highest idea or form, in other words, the most essential, more than all other ideas or forms. These are thought to be
the earliest Western theories on beauty.
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at 82. At age 78, just four years before his death, Dirac unwaveringly and unapologetically
maintained,
A good deal of my research in physics has consisted in not setting out to solve some
particular problem, but simply examining mathematical equations of a kind that
physicists use and trying to fit them together in an interesting way, regardless of any
application that the work may have. It is simply a search for pretty mathematics. It may
turn out later to have an application. Then one has good luck. (Kursunoglu & Wigner
1990, 110)
Dirac spoke of his pursuit of beauty on many occasions. I will share a few more in order
to illustrate just how significant this indicator of truth was for Dirac and the extent to which it
permeated his thinking and directed his research. Dirac also refers to beautiful mathematics,
ideas, connections and relationships as being “pretty” or “interesting.” I will be considering all of
these notions as evidence of the importance he placed on subjective experience, seeing it as
playing an equally important role (if not eliminating the distinction altogether) to objective
experience—at least in this somewhat limited yet permeating sense—in the process of
discovering how anything actually exists or comes to exist. He insists,
It is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment...
It seems that if one is working from the point of view of getting beauty in one's
equations, and if one has really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress. If there
is not complete agreement between the results of one's work and experiment, one should
not allow oneself to be too discouraged, because the discrepancy may well be due to
minor features that are not properly taken into account and that will get cleared up with
further developments of the theory. (Scientific American 1963, 47)
The mathematician plays a game in which he himself invents the rules while the physicist
plays a game in which the rules are provided by nature, but as time goes on it becomes
increasingly evident that the rules which the mathematician finds interesting are the same
as those which nature has chosen. (Stewart 2007, 279; my emphasis) [At age 36]
God used beautiful mathematics in creating the world. (Kursunoglu & Wigner 1990, xv)
[Dirac does not explain what he meant by God here but it should be noted that he
generally condemned organized religion.]
Theoretical physicists accept the need for mathematical beauty as an act of faith. There is
no compelling reason for it, but it has proved a very profitable objective in the past. For
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example, the main reason why the theory of relativity is so universally accepted is its
mathematical beauty. (Vergnaud 2014, 36)
The research worker, in his efforts to express the fundamental laws of Nature in
mathematical form, should strive mainly for mathematical beauty. He should take
simplicity into consideration in a subordinate way to beauty ... It often happens that the
requirements of simplicity and beauty are the same, but where they clash, the latter must
take precedence. (Kursunoglu & Wigner 1990, 110)
His mention of simplicity as being a less fundamental requirement of truth will be of interest in
chapter two as Levi-Strauss, Strawson and Bohr attempt to explain the necessarily opposing or
paradoxical—and therefore essentially complex though unified—nature of existence at its most
essential level and therefore throughout all subsequent levels of existence. It has been commonly
attributed to Einstein that “[e]verything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
Whether Einstein actually said this or not is irrelevant. The point remains, these five physicists
were agreed that while simplicity was desirable, the dual nature of the electron simply did not
allow it.
At age 29, in an introduction to a paper on magnetic monopoles, Quantised Singularities
in the Electromagnetic Field, given at Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 1931, Dirac
confidently proposes the need for an increasingly abstract description of reality this way:
The steady progress of physics requires for its theoretical formulation a mathematics
which get continually more advanced…it was expected that mathematics would get more
and more complicated, but would rest on a permanent basis of axioms and definitions,
while actually the modern physical developments have required a mathematics that
continually shifts its foundation and gets more abstract. Non-euclidean geometry and
noncommutative algebra, which were at one time considered to be purely fictions of the
mind and pastimes of logical thinkers, have now been found to be very necessary for the
description of general facts of the physical world. It seems likely that this process of
increasing abstraction will continue in the future and the advance in physics is to be
associated with continual modification and generalisation of the axioms at the base of
mathematics rather than with a logical development of any one mathematical scheme on
a fixed foundation. (Kragh 1990, 208)
[And at age 28] There are, at present, fundamental problems in theoretical physics … the
solution of which … will presumably require a more drastic revision of our fundamental
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concepts than any that have gone before. Quite likely, these changes will be so great that
it will be beyond the power of human intelligence to get the necessary new ideas by
direct attempts to formulate the experimental data in mathematical terms. The theoretical
worker in the future will, therefore, have to proceed in a more direct way. The most
powerful method of advance that can be suggested at present is to employ all the
resources of pure mathematics in attempts to perfect and generalize the mathematical
formalism that forms the existing basis of theoretical physics, and after each success in
this direction, to try to interpret the new mathematical features in terms of physical
entities. (Kursunoglu & Wigner 1990, 109; my emphasis)
Dirac clearly feels that straightforward purely logical accounts of existence were inadequate; that
alternative descriptions (math as metaphor) were needed to effectively approach and describe the
smallest building blocks in nature.
Though Dirac—insofar as I was able to ascertain—does not speak directly to the need to
integrate the insights of all disciplines, he indirectly demonstrates having personally done so in a
most essential way, exhibiting a balanced approach from his earliest efforts until his passing.
Albert Einstein is of particular interest because not only is he (like the others) trying to
solve the “problem” of the electron and existence at its most essential level, but he is also
somewhat responsible for the problem. It was his theories of light consisting of packets of energy
and relativity that largely created the new world view. Because epistemology and theory
knowledge can be viewed as synonymous, we can say that the quantum theory of relativity
revolutionized the rules whereby physicists may come to understand the natural world. Lawrence
M. Krauss explains the situation this way,
Science has taught us to think the unthinkable. Because when nature is the guide—rather
than a priori prejudices, hopes, fears or desires—we are forced out of our comfort zone.
One by one, pillars of classical logic have fallen by the wayside as science progressed in
the 20th century, from Einstein's realization that measurements of space and time were
not absolute but observer-dependent, to quantum mechanics, which not only put
fundamental limits on what we can empirically know but also demonstrated that
elementary particles and the atoms they form are doing a million seemingly impossible
things at once. (Krauss 2012)
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Einstein often admitted that not one of his ideas came from logic. He insisted that all of
his greatest discoveries (namely his conviction that nature and its laws are unified in some way)
came to him intuitively (sometimes spontaneously but often following intense deliberation over a
curiosity he had noticed or wondered about, for example imagining that he was travelling
alongside a beam of light and so on) at which point he attempted to prove them logically. He
firmly believed that if one could acquire a true idea about the essential nature of things
intuitively then one could deduce every other idea about it accurately from there. In 1920, he
explains the relationship between theoretical and empirical knowledge; the abstract and the
concrete and what can be known suggesting,
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they
are certain, they do not refer to reality. (Einstein 2004, 28)
Einstein described his criteria for establishing the closest relationship between theory and reality
saying,
A theory is the more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises, the more
different kinds of things it relates, and the more extended is its area of applicability.
(Holton and Elkana 1997, 227)
This statement can be seen as an indirect commentary on methodological symmetry as it states
that an impressive theory extends the area of applicability beyond the context or discipline from
which it originates. It also speaks to the idea of phenomenological symmetry in that it recognizes
that the degree to which a theory is considered impressive is determined by how many different
kinds of things or phenomena it can relate.
Regarding the notion that to disclose any single aspect of something simultaneously
conceals or blinds us to other aspects of that same thing, Einstein humbly confesses in a letter to
a layman who had inquired about the pursuit of truth, February 13, 1934,
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As for the search for truth, I know from my own painful searching, with its many blind
alleys, how hard it is to take a reliable step, be it ever so small, towards the understanding
of that which is truly significant. (Dukas and Hoffman 1981, 18)
Concerning the way energy and matter only seem different, he later—in a 1979 Nova
Television production—explains the relative nature of (the relationship between) these two
phenomena saying,
It follows from the theory of relativity that mass and energy are both different
manifestations of the same thing—a somewhat unfamiliar conception for the average
man. Furthermore E=MC2, in which energy is put equal to mass multiplied with the
square of the velocity of light, showed that a very small amount of mass may be
converted into a very large amount of energy... the mass and energy were in fact
equivalent. (Calaprice 1996, 183; my emphasis)
In chapter IV, I will further develop the relationship between Heidegger’s idea of disclosure and
concealment and Einstein’s notion of relativity. For now, it is self-evident they were both
considering the manifold aspects of a single phenomenon as being essentially equivalent.
The following statements all reflect Einstein’s belief that the insights of all disciplines
and traditions must be seen as relative perspectives on the same problems science was
considering and that multiple perspectives were compulsory in any comprehensive description of
existence:
All religions, arts and sciences are branches of the same tree. (Einstein 1956, 9)
It is the theory which decides what we can observe. (Heisenberg 1971, 77)
It would be possible to describe absolutely everything scientifically, but it would make no
sense. It would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a
variation of wave pressure. (Attributed to Einstein by Max Born. Paraphrased by Clark
1972, 243)
In the paper Science, Philosophy and Religion, presented in 1941, Einstein poetically asserts,
“Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind” (Calaprice 1996, 153). From
a paper, Physics and Reality, published in the Franklin Institute Journal March 1936, Einstein
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wrote, “The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking” (Einstein
1956, 59).
Einstein believed that common and scientific thinking are related and therefore relatable despite
the degree to which each has become grossly pronounced. Upon appointment as the first
president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, Berlin, formed for the advancement of science in 1911,
regards an interdisciplinary approach to discovery, Adolf von Harnack notes, “People complain
that our generation has no philosophers. They are wrong. They now sit in another faculty. Their
names are Max Planck and Albert Einstein” (Seelig 1956, 45). Hans Reichenbach also seems to
have understood the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the conditions for existence as
well when he said, “It appears that the solution of the problem of time and space is reserved to
philosophers who, like Leibniz, are mathematicians, or to mathematicians who, like Einstein, are
philosophers” (Schilpp 1959, 307).
In regards to subjective experience being, not only reliable but necessary to the furthering
of the scientific understanding of how anything exists or comes to exist, Einstein concludes, in a
letter written January 24, 1936,
But, on the other hand, every one who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science
becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the Universe—a spirit vastly
superior to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest powers must
feel humble. (Dukas and Hoffman 1981, 33)
On multiple occasions he reiterates this same notion explaining,
Curiosity has its own reason for existing. One cannot help but be in awe when he
contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality.
(Isaacson 2008, 548) [As recalled by editor William Miller in Life magazine, May 2,
1955]
How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is
[subjective experience and supposedly] independent of [objective] experience, is so
admirably appropriate to the objects of reality? (Einstein 1949, 24-28) [From an address
to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin January 27, 1921]
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I believe in intuition and inspiration. Imagination is more important than knowledge. For
knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating
progress, giving birth to evolution. It is, strictly speaking, a real factor in scientific
research. (Einstein 1931, 97)
It must be conceded that a theory has an important advantage if its basic concepts and
fundamental hypotheses are 'close to experience,' and greater confidence in such a theory
is certainly justified. There is less danger of going completely astray, particularly since it
takes so much less time and effort to disprove such theories by experience. Yet more and
more, as the depth of our knowledge increases, we must give up this advantage in our
quest for logical simplicity in the foundations of physical theory…. (Levy 1950, 19)
Once again assuming a relativistic perspective, Einstein logically concludes: “Epistemology
without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—
insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled” (Keyes 2006, 51-52).
In a January 19, 1936 letter written in response to a sixth grader from a New York City Sunday
School asking if scientists pray, Einstein’s thoughtful reply reads,
…it must be admitted that our actual knowledge of these laws is only imperfect and
fragmentary, so that, actually, the belief in the existence of basic all-embracing laws in
Nature also rests on a sort of faith. All the same this faith has been largely justified so far
by the success of scientific research. (Dukas and Hoffman 1981, 32-33)
The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be
merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new
possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and
marks real advances in science. (Einstein and Infeld 1938, 92)
As stated to Forbes magazine September 15, 1974, he explains,
The intellect has little to do on the road to discovery. There comes a leap in
consciousness, call it intuition or what you will, and the solution comes to you and you
don’t know why or how. (Chang 2006, 179)
The mind can proceed only so far upon what it knows and can prove. There comes a
point where the mind takes a higher plane of knowledge, but can never prove how it got
there. All great discoveries have involved such a leap. (Clark 1972, 755)
The most beautiful emotion we can experience is the mystical. It is the power of all true
art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer wonder and
stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead. [“his eyes are closed”] To know that what is
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impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most
radiant beauty, which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive
forms — this knowledge, this feeling, is at the center of true religiousness. In this sense,
and in this sense only, I belong to the rank of devoutly religious men. (Olson 2014, 13)
The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious—the fundamental emotion
which stands at the cradle of true art and true science. (Einstein 1949, 7)
In a 1918 address given in honor of Max Planck’s36 sixtieth birthday, Einstein said,
The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from
which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these
laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them.
(Einstein 1934, 4)
From an essay, On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation, published in Scientific American
April 1950,
The theoretical idea … does not arise apart from and independent of experience; nor can
it be derived from experience by a purely logical procedure. It is produced by a creative
act. Once a theoretical idea has been acquired, one does well to hold fast to it until it
leads to an untenable conclusion. (Levy 1950, 14; my emphasis)
From an essay, On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation, published in Scientific American
April 1950,
There exists a passion for comprehension, just as there exists a passion for music. That
passion is rather common in children but gets lost in most people later on. Without this
passion, there would be neither mathematics nor natural science. (Levy 1950, 13)
In 1959, Karl Popper37 spoke of the process of scientific discovery this way,
My view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical
method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be
expressed by saying that every discovery contains an 'irrational element,' or 'a creative
intuition,' in Bergson's38 sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the 'search for those
highly universal laws ... from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure
36

Max Planck (1858-1947) was a German physicist who postulated that energy may be granular, originating
quantum mechanics in the process. His contribution to theoretical physics and my argument is discussed in more
detail later in chapter two of my thesis.
37
Karl Popper (1902-1994) Austrian-British generally considered the greatest twentieth century philosopher of
science.
38
Henri Louis Bergson (1859-1941) was a French philosopher whose vitalism philosophy demonstrated the
importance of pure intuition for which he was awarded the 1927 Nobel Prize in literature.
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deduction. There is no logical path.' he says, 'leading to these ... laws. They can only be
reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfühlung) of the
objects of experience.' (Popper 2002, 8)
Once again, Spinoza’s influence on Einstein is evident. In regards to beauty, Sir Hermann
Bondi39 reminisces,
What I remember most clearly was that when I put down a suggestion that seemed to me
cogent and reasonable, Einstein did not in the least contest this, but he only said, 'Oh,
how ugly.' As soon as an equation seemed to him to be ugly, he really rather lost interest
in it and could not understand why somebody else was willing to spend much time on it.
He was quite convinced that beauty was a guiding principle in the search for important
results in theoretical physics. (Zee 1987, 1)
Although science was able to side-step the true nature of the electron by moving forward
with probability calculations that enabled reliable experimentation and commodification of
quantum theory, perhaps one of the greatest proponents of applied quantum theory, Richard
Feynman40 acknowledges, “Einstein was a giant. His head was in the clouds, but his feet were on
the ground. Those of us who are not so tall have to choose!” (Mead 2002, xix).
Baron C. P. Snow41 spoke of Einstein’s reliance on subjective experience this way,
Einstein, twenty-six years old, only three years away from crude privation, still a patent
examiner, published in the Annalen der Physik in 1905 five papers on entirely different
subjects. Three of them were among the greatest in the history of physics. One, very
simple, gave the quantum explanation of the photoelectric effect—it was this work for
which, sixteen years later, he was awarded the Nobel prize. Another dealt with the
phenomenon of Brownian motion, the apparently erratic movement of tiny particles
suspended in a liquid: Einstein showed that these movements satisfied a clear statistical
law. This was like a conjuring trick, easy when explained: before it, decent scientists
could still doubt the concrete existence of atoms and molecules: this paper was as near to
a direct proof of their concreteness as a theoretician could give. The third paper was the
special theory of relativity, which quietly amalgamated space, time, and matter into one
fundamental unity. This last paper contains no references and quotes no authority. All of
them are written in a style unlike any other theoretical physicists. They contain very little
mathematics. There is a good deal of verbal commentary. The conclusions, the bizarre
39
Sir Hermann Bondi (1919-2005) was an Austrian-British mathematician and cosmologist who postulated the
steady-state theory of the universe with Fred Hoyle and Thomas Gold in 1948.
40
Richard Feynman (1918-1988) was an American theoretical physicist, one of the most recognized in his field. He
shared the 1965 Nobel Prize in physics with Sin-Itiro Tomonaga and Julian Schwinger for their fundamental work in
QED or quantum electrodynamics.
41
Baron C. P. Snow (1905-1980) was an English physical chemist (incidentally physical chemistry is an
interdisciplinary study now considered its own discipline), politician and novelist.
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conclusions, emerge as though with the greatest of ease: the reasoning is unbreakable. It
looks as though he had reached the conclusions by pure thought, unaided, without
listening to the opinions of others. To a surprisingly large extent, that is precisely what
he had done. (Snow 1966, 100-101; my emphasis)
Once again, while I intend to expand my research eventually to include a more
comprehensive study of the epistemological development of science, philosophy and folklore,
my intention here is merely to establish that interdisciplinarity has been recognized by each of
these disciplines as necessary in overcoming the limitations of the prevailing epistemologies
characteristic to each respective discipline. In other words, methodological symmetry assumes—
as the name suggests—that while various disciplines appear distinct, they are common and
without fundamental difference. They are merely distinct approaches to phenomena that reveal
meaningful and useful—though ultimately superficial—aspects of the fundamental whole that is
reality.
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CHAPTER III
NECESSARY OPPOSITION

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether or not folklore, philosophy and
physics’ conceptions of necessary opposition are compatible. To do this I am comparing one
scholar from each discipline who has devoted their work to describing the dual nature of
existence. While chapter one speaks to the notion of methodological symmetry in terms of
interdisciplinarity—or the need for an interdisciplinary approach to phenomena, chapter two is
primarily concerned with applying methodological symmetry to a specific phenomenon—
necessary opposition. In other words, chapter II looks at methodological symmetry as a
collective epistemology well suited to the study of complex and widespread phenomena whereas
chapter III employs methodological symmetry in order to investigate a particular complex and
widespread phenomenon which I am calling “necessary opposition.” To facilitate the easy
recognition of the common features found throughout the distinct accounts of necessary
opposition within this chapter—as in chapter II—I am presenting my conclusions forthwith.
The following descriptions of necessary opposition as a fundamental aspect of existence
hold at least these five suppositions common. Following Hufford’s lead and from this point
forward, I will be referring to these suppositions as the primary features of the theory42 of
necessary opposition.

Primary Features of the Theory of Necessary Opposition:
1. Experience43 exists.
42

I emphasize theory here only because an apparently “separate” category which I plan to call the experience of
necessary opposition has emerged as a result of the research I have conducted here. This “new” category proves to
unnecessarily complicate this study and so I have saved a more complete investigation of this important distinction
for future examination.
43
Both objective and subjective experience literally exist (or exist-nonexist as this chapter will suggest).
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2. Existence is binary.
3. Binary existence poses immediate and inescapable difficulties to orthodox
descriptions of existence.
4. Binary existence must be intelligible from some possible perspective.
5. Due to the irreducible nature of binary existence, symmetry (distinction without
difference) is currently the only viable premise to accommodate it.
The preceding list is intended to engage and direct the reader toward the primary features
(elements present in all three accounts) of the following “different” approaches to and
descriptions of the nature of existence. In the process I hope to establish that essentially the
following scholars and scientists were trying to shed light on the same principle way in which
anything exists. While secondary features (elements present in two of the three accounts) and
tertiary features (elements found in one account only) will be informally mentioned in this
chapter, they will not be explicitly engaged until chapter IV. Chapter IV will then specifically
explore the concepts of discrepancy and symmetry and how, if we assume symmetry, at least
some of the secondary and tertiary features (distinct aspects) of these and other diverse
descriptions of existence can inform one another and ultimately be viewed as related aspects of a
dynamic whole.

Claude Lévi-Strauss on Binary Opposition
In Myth and Meaning as well as in The Raw and the Cooked, Lévi-Strauss summarizes his
approach—widely known as the structuralist approach; an approach which, incidentally, he
adopted from linguistics in order to better understand and ‘interpret’ (or ‘translate’ as he
sometimes called it) myth. In order to relate his version of necessary opposition, which he called
binary opposition, we must first acquaint ourselves with the context in which he established his
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description of the requirements for existence. Levi-Strauss believed that all meaning—and
therefore existence as an idea or otherwise—is derived from the necessarily binary
relationships44 perceived in nature and that the human mind instinctively strives for the
reconciliation and comprehensibility of these fundamental binaries. Indeed, for Lévi-Strauss,
myth originates from the innate human desire (or passion according to Einstein) for meaning, the
inborn need to achieve a general understanding of the universe or to generalize the seemingly
inconsistent (mysterious) relationships encountered in the world. He states, “It is, I think,
absolutely impossible to conceive of meaning without order.” Then, after considering what the
verb ‘to mean’ even means, he asserts that meaning consists of the relationship between ideas
(and I would add entities) and not within the ideas (or entities) themselves, saying, “that ‘to
mean’ means the ability of any kind of data to be translated in[to] a different language.” once
again using “language” metaphorically to “translate” or mediate the numerous and various
accounts of necessary opposition found in all cultures across space and time, essentially
mediating the binary relationship between existence and nonexistence itself. He continues, “Now
what would a translation be without rules? It would be absolutely impossible to understand.”
concluding, “To speak of rules and to speak of meaning is to speak of the same thing.” He
explains that all “intellectual undertakings of mankind” involve “introduce[ing] some kind of
order.” This is significant for Lévi-Strauss because it sets the stage for structural thought as he
then relates this “basic need for order in the human mind” to the inherent order of the universe,
saying, “the need probably exists because there is some order in the universe” (Levi-Strauss

44
This logic is well supported in both Eastern and Western philosophy. I give one example: from Plato’s Phaedo we
read, “…between each of those pairs of opposites there are two processes: from the one to the other and then again
from the other to the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and decrease, and we call the one
increasing and the other decreasing…Therefore, if these are opposites, they come to be from one another…[for
example] to be asleep and to be awake; to be awake comes from sleeping, and to sleep comes from being awake…”
(Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2005, 241) Later in the Phaedo, Plato reiterates the theme using the example of hot and
cold, saying that “cold” has no meaning in the absence of the experience of “hot” and vice-versa.
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1978, 9; my emphasis) a universe of which the human mind is certainly a part. While LéviStrauss emphasizes: It is the intrinsic striving for the intelligibility of existential binaries that is
structural, I will be suggesting further, particularly in chapter three, that the experience of
existence (not just the idea of existence) is binary and that the discord produced by literally
existing binarily, as well as the subsequent desire or need (and I would add, ability) to reconcile
it, are structural.
In the modern era, “people without writing” were generally believed to possess an
inferior cognitive ability if not a different kind of thought altogether. Many academics referred to
this presumably “primitive” and “irrational” way of thinking as the savage mind and considered
it distinct from the allegedly more “advanced” and “rational” way of thinking which they called
the civilized mind. Some scholars, such as Lévy-Bruhl, considered it a fundamental difference
saying, “the basic difference between ‘primitive’ thought…and modern thought is that the first is
entirely determined by emotion and mystic representations” (Levi-Strauss 1978, 12) while
others, such as Malinowski, viewed it as more of a linear evolutionary development from
primitive to sophisticated thinking determined wholly by the basic needs of life. Levi-Strauss
was among the first to suggest that there was in fact no physical difference between the “savage”
and the “civilized” mind. Building on this paradigm altering premise, he further proposed that
because the mind is anatomically uniform in virtually all human subjects, it is then conceivable
that there exist in the mind conceptions or patterns of thought that are universal in nature. He
explains, “Whereas Malinowski’s is a utilitarian conception, the other [Lévy-Bruhl’s] is an
emotional or affective conception; and what I have tried to emphasize is that actually the thought
of people without writing is, or can be in many instances, on the one hand, disinterested—and
this is a difference in relation to Malinowski—and, on the other hand, intellectual—a difference
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in relation to Lévy-Bruhl” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 12). In other words, “these people whom we
usually consider as completely subservient to the need of not starving…are perfectly capable of
disinterested thinking; that is they are moved by a need or a desire to understand the world
around them…[and] to achieve that end, they proceed by intellectual means, exactly as a
philosopher, or even to some extent a scientist, can and would do” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 13).
However, he cautions that this is not to say that mythical thought is equal or identical to
scientific thought clarifying,
…it remains different in a way, and inferior in another way. It remains different because
its aim is to reach by the shortest possible means a general understanding of the
universe—and not only a general but a total understanding. That is, it is a way of thinking
which must imply that if you don’t understand everything, you don’t explain anything.
This is entirely in contradiction to what scientific thinking does, which is to proceed step
by step, trying to give explanations for very limited phenomena, and then going on to
other kinds of phenomena, and so on. As Descartes had already said, scientific thinking
aimed to divide the difficulty into as many parts as were necessary in order to solve it.
(Lévi-Strauss 1978, 13)
In short, Lévi-Strauss seems to consider these two modes of thinking as symmetrical or
superficially distinct but without substantial difference.
Lévi-Strauss asserts that because myths are “narratives that explain how the world and
man came to be in their present form” (Dundes, 1998, 1), they unavoidably address the binary
relationship existence-nonexistence and subsequently (if not identically as per Strawson and
Bohr) life-death which indeed would become the over-arching theme of his stunning trilogy,
Mythologique—Introduction to a Science of Mythology. I will also be considering “the problem
of the one and the many” or the individuality-universality binary (Lévi-Strauss considered
universality as the synthesis of binary opposites typically represented in myths by two opposing
individuals or phenomena) as homologous with (having the same relative position or structure
though not necessarily the same function as) the existence-nonexistence binary, as it deals with
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the relative existence-nonexistence (life-death) of anything, depending on the perspective from
which it is observed or considered.
“Ever since the advent of science in the seventeenth century, we have rejected mythology
as a product of superstitious and primitive minds” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, vii). Lévi-Strauss’
conception of the ‘primitive’ mind being endowed with the same fundamental capacities as the
‘civilized’ mind made it possible for him to establish the intelligibility of myth based on this
premise as well as his hypothesis that human thought is structural. In this way he claimed that
“myths get thought in man unbeknownst to him” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 1). Though Lévi-Strauss
was intensely criticized by other western thinkers “because their feeling [was] that from an
empirical point of view, it [was] an utterly meaningless sentence” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 1), LéviStrauss insisted that for him it described “a lived experience” and was precisely the relationship
he had with his own work. “That is,” he said, “my work gets thought in me unbeknownst to me”
(Lévi-Strauss 1978, 1). This is of particular interest to me for two reasons: 1) Hufford’s
experience-centered approach and experiential source hypothesis similarly suggest the reality of
subjective experience and 2) Like Lévi-Strauss; I have personally experienced this kind of
“knowing” as a spontaneous lived experience rather than a sought after knowledge acquired by
means of awareness and/or experimentation. In other words, I grasp and indeed have had the
experience of knowledge emerging from my mind in a virtually unsolicited way. Baruch Spinoza
(the philosopher to which most proponents of nature—or science—defer and who, incidentally,
employed a type of geometry to philosophy which parallels Levi-Straus’ algebraic approach to
folklore), in one of his more obscure works On the Immendation of the Intellect, Spinoza not
only authorizes this sort of unprompted acquisition of knowledge (when properly obtained—that
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is to say when obtained as prescribed in his aforementioned treatise45) he places it above
empirical knowledge. In fact, he deems this kind of knowing to be Truth itself; indeed a cause
without a cause and as such the source of all knowledge and existence. Even so, I must
emphatically stress that neither Lévi-Strauss nor Spinoza (nor I for that matter) is interested in
eliminating the role of science or the empirical methods of discovery to which science strictly
adheres. In fact, recognizing that if indeed the world is fundamentally binary then human thought
must also be binary, Lévi-Strauss ventures (similarly to Heidegger) that mythical thinking had
concealed scientific thinking and that the rejection of mythical thought in the 1700’s was in fact
the inevitable and necessary means whereby “scientific thought was able to constitute itself”
(Lévi-Strauss 1978, 4; my emphasis). Likewise, we could also say that Lévi-Strauss’ notion of
binary opposition necessarily implies that just as mythical thought necessitated scientific
thought, scientific thought necessitates mythical thought.
Developing his view of the presumably binary relationship between scientific and
mythical thinking and their point of synthesis, he continues,
Science has only two ways of proceeding: it is either reductionist or structuralist. It is
reductionist when it is possible to find out that very complex phenomena on one level can
be reduced to simpler phenomena on other levels…[however] when we are confronted
with phenomena too complex to be reduced to phenomena of a lower order, then we can
only approach them by looking to their relationships, that is, by trying to understand what
kind of original system they make up. (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 7)
Having noticed patterns in thought, language, customs and nature from his earliest
childhood, Lévi-Strauss would ultimately become intensely interested in the way myths from
various and diverse places and ages seemed to be similar or related and yet wildly different and

45

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) believed that all knowledge could be classified under four modes of perception: 1)
perception arising from hearsay; 2) perception we have from casual experience; 3) perception arising when the
essence of one thing is inferred from another thing…or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some
property is always present; 4) perception arising when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through
knowledge of its proximate cause. (Spinoza 1994, 111; my emphasis)
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indeed incoherent with prevailing scientific descriptions of existence. Lévi-Strauss remembers
feeling compelled to investigate the matter and bring order to what he considered the superficial
chaos generally attributed to myth. Because mythical themes such as existence-nonexistence,
individuality-universality and life-death persisted in all myths and because these phenomena
appeared irreducible, Lévi-Strauss took a structuralist approach to myth and attempted to
contrive “what kind of original system they make up” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 7).
To best describe Lévi-Strauss’ take on necessary opposition; we must look at the way he
applied his theory of binary opposition not only to the myths he studied but to his method itself.
It is noteworthy, not to mention ironic, that reductionism and structuralism are in fact binary in
and of themselves and in fact, I would argue that Lévi-Strauss’ method of viewing myth through
the lens of science is perhaps the first application of his model for reconciling opposing binary
relationships generally. Lévi-Strauss’ approach was basically to employ algebraic symbols and
jargon such as, if A is to B what C is to D then A is to C what B is to D and so on, in order to
methodically demonstrate the relatively equivalent relationship among the diverse mythical
accounts he studied. His thesis being: Because the “primitive” mind is capable of disinterested
and intellectual thinking and because the need to make opposing binaries intelligible is structural,
the invariant elements of myths should offer a single coherent account of existence.
Because Lévi-Strauss was attempting to find order amid the seeming chaos inherent to
mythical thinking, he was primarily interested in establishing binary opposition as the common
denominator of all myths and demonstrating the universality of the human need to reconcile
paradoxical phenomena, whereas I am principally endeavouring to improve the description of the
state of binary-ness by relating traditional descriptions of binary existence or necessary
opposition to scientific and philosophical descriptions of the same phenomena.
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Lévi-Strauss defines his structuralist approach to myth as “the quest for the invariant, or
for the invariant elements among superficial differences” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 6). That is to say,
although myths appear chaotic due to their multifarious dynamic elements, their conservative
elements are actually ordered and for Lévi-Strauss, that order indicated a mental arrangement
that is uniform to all human thought. If this is indeed the case, then the scientific approach to
binary existence is merely an alternate way to satisfy the inborn human desire for the
reconciliation of fundamental binaries. Lévi-Strauss also believed that because all myths are
attempts to explain binary existence, one could start with any myth and then systematically relate
neighboring myths indefinitely. He begins with the recorded observation of Father P.J. de
Arriaga, a Spanish missionary in Peru during the late 1500’s. The Father reports that when it was
bitter cold, the indigenous priest, according to custom, gathered all who had been born feet first,
or had a harelip or born twins together and reproached them for being responsible for the
inclement weather. Lévi-Strauss notes, “That twins are correlated with atmospheric disorder is
something very commonly accepted throughout the world” and in some cultures “twins were
[also] endowed with special powers to bring good weather, to dispel storms, and the like” (LéviStrauss 1978, 21-22). However, unlike other mythographers, this is not the relationship that
Lévi-Strauss is interested in. Instead he wonders why esteemed scholars—including Sir James
Frazer who actually quotes Arriaga on several occasions— “never asked the question why
people with harelips and twins are considered to be similar in some respect.” saying, “It seems to
me that the crux of the problem is to find out: why harelips? why twins? and why are harelips
and twins put together?” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 22). To solve the problem, he conscripts various
myths from Peru to western Canada. All of the accounts include twin or twin-like figures with
opposing characteristics. In one myth, one twin becomes the sun and the other the moon, in
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another; one twin is brave and the other a coward, in yet another; one is a protector of the people
and the other a prodigal and so on. Levi-Strauss summarizes, “So we may say in all cases
children who are said to be twins or believed to be twins…will have different adventures later on
which, if I may say so, untwin them” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 24). From there, Lévi-Strauss takes a
much criticized leap by identifying that in one Salish Indian account, the mother of a twin figure
steps over a log in the woods under which a magical hare has hidden himself, waiting to peek at
her private parts and mock her for being seduced by a trickster posing as her husband-to-be (also
a prevailing feature of North and South American twin myths). She is furious at the hare and
smacks his face with her walking stick, splitting his nose. “This is why the animals of leporine
family now have a split nose and upper lip, which we call a harelip in people precisely on
account of this anatomical peculiarity in rabbits and hares” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 25). He then
incorporates a Kwakiutl Indian account of a young girl who is hated for being born with a
harelip. One day “a supernatural cannibal woman, appears and steals all of the children…[and]
puts them all in her basket in order to take them home to eat them” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 25). The
girl with the harelip is captured first and thrown in the bottom of the basket. Once all the children
are in the basket, the ogress puts the basket on her back. The small girl with the harelip manages
to cut open the bottom of the basket with a seashell she had collected from the beach and drops
to the ground feet first unbeknownst to the ogress. For Lévi-Strauss the connection is evident as
he confidently declares, “This obviously clears up the connection from which we started in
Father Arriaga’s Peruvian relations between twins, people born feet first, and people with
harelips”46 (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 26). Although I have greatly simplified Lévi-Strauss’ findings
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This kind of “hocus pocus” pattern identification ultimately undermined the reputation of comparative methods
and contributed to the general abandonment of this approach by folklore as a discipline, particularly in regards to
sacred narratives.
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into a succinct summary, my purpose is merely to exemplify his idea of binary opposition in a
concrete manner that typifies his work.
His identification of myths as being primarily descriptions of binary opposition and the
attempted conceptual resolution of those binaries through allegorical narratives is often referred
to as the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad (similar to Bohr’s conception of analysis and synthesis)
and will be an important concept which I will further develop throughout this chapter and
reiterate and employ exclusively in chapter IV.
While Lévi-Strauss was attempting to prove that all myths are fundamentally related in
that they all speak to the necessarily binary nature of existence, my focus remains the description
of necessary opposition itself. As such, I am primarily interested in the way these twin myths all
speak to existing in a binary way. In other words, I am less concerned with definitively showing
how these accounts specifically align as I am interested in how they demonstrate the notion of
the one being or becoming many and the many being or becoming one again or still or whatever
the case may be.
An additional insight by Lévi-Strauss which seems to support his explanation of
existence being both singular and binary at once (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) is the role of the
hare as binary opposition embodied in one entity. In the Algonquian belief system, the hare is
“the highest deity in which they believed” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 26). From a functionalist
perspective, mythologists have ventured such explanations as: the hare was a main part of the
Ojibwa diet or that the agility and speed of the hare exemplified useful traits to which Ojibwa
people will have aspired and so on. However according to Lévi-Strauss’ take on necessary
opposition and the inborn human need to reconcile paradoxical phenomena—at least
conceptually if not actually—we can conclude that the hare is the highest deity within the belief
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system of this group because not only is the hare an “incipient twin” as Lévi-Strauss suggested in
the earlier Salish account due to the split in its lip, but indeed the Ojibwa hare deity is described
in the exact same way as the twins of the other accounts, that is, “sometimes he is a very wise
deity who is in charge of putting the universe in order, and sometimes he is a ridiculous clown
who goes from mishap to mishap” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 27-28). Lévi-Strauss notes that while the
choice of such an “ambiguous character…has worried commentators and anthropologists” he
suggests that “the choice of the hare by the Algonkian Indians” is best explained as their need to
reconcile paradoxical relationships, reiterating that the hare is “an individual who is between two
conditions…a) a single deity beneficent to mankind and b) twins, one of whom is good and the
other bad. Being not yet entirely divided in two, being not yet twins, the two opposite
characteristics can remain merged in one and the same person” (Lévi-Strauss 1978, 28).
Once again, the purpose of this chapter is to establish whether or not folklore, philosophy
and physics’ conceptions of necessary opposition are compatible. To do this I am comparing one
scholar from each discipline who has devoted their work to describing the dual nature of
existence. However, I plan to eventually expand my study of necessary opposition by
investigating multiple scholars from each discipline at some point in order to confirm the
preliminary findings I have identified here (i.e. the primary features of the theory of necessary
opposition as listed in the introduction of this chapter.) We'll now move from Lévi-Strauss in the
folkloric realm to Strawson in the philosophical realm, where Lévi-Strauss's binary opposition
appears in a different form.

Galen Strawson on Equal-Status Monism
In Part I: Agnostic Materialism of his book Mental Reality, as well as later in
Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism, Strawson, in an
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effort to establish symmetry (distinction without difference) as the most viable premise for
describing fundamental reality, contends that asymmetry and irreducibility claims are
incompatible. “How is it possible for there to be asymmetrical dependence without reducibility
in some possible or optimal physics?” (Strawson 1994, 70) he asks. He begins with an argument
against asymmetry claims by insisting that any serious materialist47 must accept the real and
completely physical existence of experience. He drags Descartes into it by talking about how
there cannot exist “degrees of reality, and so there can be no asymmetry in the reality status of
experiential reality and nonexperiential reality” (Strawson 1994, 66). He explains how modern
materialist claims tend to parallel the scientific world view. For example, most evolutionists
would take the position that before living organisms evolved on the planet, there were only (or at
least what appear to be) nonexperiential physical things; that as life forms became increasingly
complex, the physical properties of the experiential must have evolved from the physical
properties of the nonexperiential.
When framed this way, it would definitely seem that experiential reality depends on
nonexperiential reality in a way that nonexperiential reality does not depend on experiential
reality; giving asymmetry claims the appearance of being “extremely influential” (Strawson
1994, 66). In this view (which Strawson classifies as standard asymmetrical materialism) the
experiential is always “based in, or realized by, or otherwise dependent on, the
nonexperiential…that wherever there is experiential reality, there is nonexperiential reality but
not conversely” (Strawson 1994, 73). Furthermore, the two may not coexist in such a way that
gives sovereignty or independence to the experiential.
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A materialist is a type of philosopher who holds that matter is fundamental and that all mental phenomena
originate from and can be reduced to the interaction of “normal” matter. Materialism is a monistic philosophy.
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While these arguments “can sound very plausible” (Strawson 1994, 67), Strawson is
quick to point out that if one is a real materialist “as one must be” (Strawson 2006, 6) then we
cannot ignore the way that color experience and liquidity (Strawson later admits the weakness in
this particular analogy, as liquidity, it would seem, can be mechanically reduced and explained
by nonexperiential physics) seem to resemble their nonexperiential ‘counterparts’ “however
much they may also differ from them” (Strawson 1994, 68). He insists further, though standard
asymmetry materialism, theoretically, can be said to be a logical, fully explicable, regression of
experiential reality to nonexperiential reality, it is thought to be “very hard—impossible—to
imagine” (Strawson 1994, 68).
While critical of reduction theses, Strawson seems even less convinced by irreducibility
claims, seeing irreducibility (at least in its more ethereal forms) as a “rather banal thesis about
the limitations on human understanding” (Strawson 1994, 69). He explains that despite
experiential facts that seem to be registered at various “levels of description” (Strawson 1994,
69), which don’t appear to be reducible, other experiential phenomena—like color—seem to
persist as being wholly dependent on nonexperiential phenomena. He notes that as long as there
must be dependence, it is preferable that it at least be “intelligible or explicable in [some]
possible physics” (Strawson 1994, 69) rather than unintelligible to the human mind; inexplicable
“even to God, as it were” (Strawson 1994, 69).
After tedious analysis of the various intricate distinctions inherent to each of these two
camps, Strawson definitively favors a position that assumes intelligibility and explicability; that
“there [must be] a single, unified, nonmiraculous physical reality…[and therefore] some possible
valid unified theoretical account of it” (Strawson 1994, 69). He presents a third ideology where
mental reality and physical reality enjoy equal-status. In this way, asymmetry is avoided and
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irreducibility redressed. He claims, “Reality is irreducibly both experiential and nonexperiential
(both mental and nonmental), while being substantially single in some way W that we do not
fully understand, [but nevertheless is potentially understandable]” (Strawson 1994, 73; my
emphasis). He continues, “The truth is that the experiential and nonexperiential properties of the
physical coexist in such a way that neither can be said to be based in, or realized by, or in any
way asymmetrically dependent on the other; or if there is any sense in which one can reasonably
be said to be dependent on the other, then this sense applies equally both ways” (Strawson 1994,
73). He calls this third “camp,” equal-status monism.48 He feels this is a better version of
irreducibility and indeed should replace the view of non-reductive monists, leaving only one
viable metaphysic, panpsychism, which he divides into two kinds of monism; 1) experiencerealizing monism for proponents of asymmetry theories and 2) experience-involving monism for
advocates of traditional irreducibility theses, including dualists and idealists, asserting, “there
seems to be no reason to think that monism, in one form or another, cannot deliver everything
that dualists have traditionally wanted” (Strawson 1994, 43). Ultimately, he largely discredits the
former (experience-realizing) by exposing the inherent problem in saying that some things have
experience while others only possess the “capacity” for experience, allowing only the latter
(experience involving) as a viable metaphysic. Yet, he maintains, there are “surviving
distinction[s]” (Strawson 1994, 78) between these views; that in fact all these metaphysical
thought experiments, thankfully, leave us with “a better feeling for our ignorance” (Strawson
1994, 78). He criticizes contemporary materialists who are too quick to favor a particular view
with little or no grounding, thereby further muddying the waters, so to speak. With characteristic
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Though he was almost certainly not intentionally employing Lévi-Strauss’ thesis-antithesis-synthesis model,
Strawson’s view of asymmetry-irreducibility-equal status monism and subsequently, experiential-nonexperientialpanpsychic certainly exemplify it. Notably Strawson’s concerns here are also directly relatable to the ongoing
tension in quantum physics regarding determinate, probability and unified theories.
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wit and unapologetic ease, he adds “Where does this leave us? Alarmed, perhaps…” (Strawson
1994, 78).
He concludes by charging the verification positivists (logical positivists) with wrongfully
believing that they have somehow side-stepped metaphysics and all its untidy axioms and
indemonstrable conclusions. He asserts, to claim that anything exists, including mere sense data,
is to accept that it exists somehow; a somehow that begs to be fully explained, and that to believe
otherwise is to be deceived. In conclusion he chides, “Today the most common form of the
delusion is to think that one can be a tough metaphysics-eschewing positivist and also a hardnosed materialist” (Strawson 1994, 79). Strawson clearly, not only regards this take on reality to
be reckless, but indeed mistaken.
Modern physics, according to some quantum theorists, increasingly describes a
fundamental reality where seemingly nonexperiential-like entities such as quarks and leptons
emerge from what appear to be experiential-like entities such as ideas, intelligence, energies,
behavior itself (active principles of some kind). Other theorists propose that (as I have already
mentioned) even energy is more material-like than was once thought (photons and gravitons etc.)
In this way, Strawson’s brand of panpsychism seems to be fairly reconciled with some of the
prevailing notions of quantum field theory and electro/chromo dynamics. Indeed, regarding
fundamental symmetry (distinction without difference) and the simultaneous disclosureconcealment of the seemingly manifold aspects of a presumably unified reality, Strawson
maintains that while, “[t]he object/property/state/process/event cluster of distinctions is
unexceptionable in everyday life, [it is] wholly superficial from the point of view of science and
metaphysics (Strawson 2006, 198; my emphasis). This leads us directly to Bohr and his version
of necessary opposition.
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Niels Bohr on Complementarity
In the introductory pages to The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr Volume IV:
Causality and Complementarity, Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse present the array of criticism that
plagued Bohr’s philosophy from the onset when he first suggested complementarity in 1927 as
well as ongoing conflicting commentary which persists today as current scholars attempt to
conclude exactly what Bohr was even trying to say. Following Faye and Folse’s brief
introduction, the book then is entirely a collection of Bohr’s lectures given over a 60-year period
regarding his belief that complementarity is the fundamental epistemology—that is, the only one
capable of generalizing our understanding of existence and the superficially distinct viewpoints
perceived from within and advanced by each of the various disciplines and traditions.
Before demonstrating how Bohr’s complementarity does or does not relate to LéviStrauss’ binary opposition and Strawson’s equal-status monism—and subsequently my notion of
necessary opposition—I will draw on the expertise of Faye and Folse in providing a summary of
the context they afford in the introduction to Bohr’s own writings regarding the conception and
evolution of his controversial unifying philosophy. Both in the process of, as well as following
this summary, I will describe complementarity itself according to Bohr as well as his critics and
finally, demonstrate how it aligns (as well as contradicts at times) with the theories already
presented in this chapter from folklore and philosophy.
In 1900, keeping new developments in the study of electromagnetism within the
conventional parameters of classical wave mechanics—at least statistically—Max Plank
introduced the mathematical formalism h or the quantum of action,49 now known as Plank’s
constant. Plank’s inference that the energy of the electromagnetic wave emitted by a charged
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When Plank originally introduced the quantum of action, it referred to what was happening to light energy that
was being absorbed or emitted not to the properties of light itself.
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atomic oscillator50 in the wall of a black body be considered quantized (or granular) led Einstein,
in his 1905 paper on the photoelectric effect, to postulate that the energy of a charged atomic
oscillator in the wall of a black body and the energy of the electromagnetic wave itself are
related and that light actually is quantized; that light (electromagnetic waves or “quantum” as
Plank called them) consists of “packets of energy” (or “quanta” which further investigation
would indeed confirm to be discrete physical units or “particles” of light which were eventually
termed “photons”) necessitating the advent of quantum mechanics in order to supplement the
apparently incomplete account of nature put forth and upheld by classical mechanics.
Faye and Folse assert that more than any other early quantum theorist, Neils Bohr was
determined to find a philosophical perspective that would transform our understanding of how
the object of human knowledge relates to physical reality. “Not only did he maintain
that…‘complementarity’ provided for a consistent and harmonious interpretation of the quantum
mechanical account of atomic systems, but also he held that this general philosophical outlook
taught an ‘epistemological lesson’ and entailed a ‘thorough revision of our attitude towards
physical reality [or existence]’” (Bohr 1998, 1). Naturally, Bohr’s grandiose claims were met
with fevered skepticism from his contemporaries. Ironically, while his far-reaching statements
beg for “extensive and systematic exposition” (Bohr 1998, 1) it would seem that Bohr (though
having expressed a strong desire and intention to do so on many occasions) simply never got
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An oscillator is a mechanical or electronic device that works on the principles of oscillation: a periodic fluctuation
between two things based on changes in energy. An atomic oscillator uses the quantized energy levels in atoms or
molecules as the source of its resonance. The laws of quantum mechanics dictate that the energies of a bound
system, such as an atom, have certain discrete values. An electromagnetic field at a particular frequency can boost
an atom from one energy level to a higher one. Or, an atom at a high energy level can drop to a lower level by
emitting energy. The resonance frequency (f) of an atomic oscillator is the difference between the two energy levels
divided by Plank’s constant (h). The principle underlying the atomic oscillator is that since all atoms of a specific
element are identical, they should produce exactly the same frequency when they absorb or release energy.
(http://tf.nist.gov/general/enc-am.htm)
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around to it. However, in Bohr’s defense—and having tackled the subject of necessary
opposition myself (in a more general way) here in this thesis—I contend that complementarity is
not easily exposed; that it perhaps even resists systematic analysis. Nevertheless, there remain
contradictions in Bohr’s philosophy (though perhaps only superficial) that must be
acknowledged, if not resolved, before presenting Bohr’s theory as a coherent account of
necessary opposition from the domain of physics that might reveal distinct aspects regarding the
nature of existence generally.
Contemporary scholars such as Sandro Petruccioli in his book, Atoms, Metaphors and
Paradoxes, and Ulrich Röseberg in his paper, Hidden Historicity: The Challenge of Bohr’s
Philosophical Thought both note that Bohr’s essays often portray complementarity as the natural
and inevitable progression of the historical developments in quantum physics that Petruccioli
calls a “rational reconstruction” of historical events which serve to justify the legitimacy of his
claims. Röseberg adds that this “hidden historicity” perceived by Bohr in fact seems to have
“shape[d] his own personal reasoning towards complementarity” (Bohr 1998, 2; my emphasis).
Another concern is the way Bohr’s views appear to have evolved from 1927 to the post
World War II period. While some scholars feel that Bohr was merely making strategic
modifications in terminology and refining his presentation in order to more clearly express his
philosophy to an increasingly critical audience, others feel his views “may have undergone a
substantial change in response to various arguments advanced by Einstein, especially in the
famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen challenge of 1935” (Bohr 1998, 2) where Einstein challenges51
the “completeness” of the theory of complementarity as well as the seeming incongruity of the
“uncertainty principle” with the very nature of the scientific process—which deeply concerned
51

Einstein’s question of “completeness” was actually not a criticism but Bohr seems to have taken the comment as a
challenge. Einstein actually preferred incompleteness and its implication that the electron perhaps exists in itself in
some consistent way.
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not only proponents of a determinist scheme (such as Einstein and Schrödinger) but Bohr’s
positivist colleagues as well (incidentally, a good share of the philosophical push for a positivist
approach to nature was coming from his homeland, Denmark). Nevertheless, Einstein himself
seems rather indifferent to the ongoing alterations and reforms in Bohr’s philosophy, saying, “He
utters his opinions like one perpetually groping and never like one who believes himself to be in
possession of the truth” (Becker 1957, 52). I would argue that Einstein’s comment is too
dismissive. I intend to use Bohr’s findings as reliable insights into the nature of necessary
opposition; to demonstrate that his description of binary existence indeed corroborates with the
primary features found in the accounts of Lévi-Strauss and Strawson. This is not to say that I will
be attempting to validate or synchronize all Bohr’s claims. I will simply be demonstrating that
Bohr’s arguments contain all of the primary features of the theory of necessary opposition to this
point as well as acknowledging the points at which Bohr’s ideas diverge from either of the
previous scholars in terms of secondary and tertiary features of what I am calling the theory of
necessary opposition. The potentially disconcerting part of this process will be the way that I
draw from both Bohr’s 1927 and post WWII (allegedly conflicting) versions of complementarity
in order to do so. Remember the purpose of my study is not so much to achieve a tidy view of
existence as it is to improve the collective description of the phenomenon of existence by
assuming phenomenological symmetry (distinction without difference) necessarily entails
methodological symmetry and vice versa.
Remember from chapter II, these early quantum physicists were faced with the
inescapably dual nature of the electron which appeared to possess the characteristics of both a
wave and a particle depending on which instruments were used to observe it. While
mathematical formulas were developed to adequately manage the problem in terms of
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experimentation, manipulation and application of atomic processes, the question of the electron’s
truest nature has yet to be answered. When we look at the familiar macroscopic version of nature
as perceived by our unassisted senses, it seems obvious that the world is real (and multiform);
that it exists. From this experiential point of reference, Bohr establishes complementarity in
1927. Based on classical mechanics, material objects actually exist in objective, quantifiable
ways and can be systematically or logically reduced from complex structures to simpler ones, so
the assumption early on (and for many still today) was that all substances could theoretically
(and thereby eventually) be broken down into their basic part(s). However, when scientists
investigated the smallest constituents of matter, they discovered that those subatomic particles
themselves exist in an irreducibly binary way that seemed to defy human logic. Bohr’s earliest
statements involving his philosophy of complementarity indicate that to adequately describe the
disposition of the electron, both a corpuscular and undulatory description are required; that we
need both wave and particle characteristics to obtain a complete picture (although Einstein, as I
already mentioned, would challenge the completeness of that description) of the essential nature
of the most general building blocks of matter as we know it. However, for Bohr this did not
imply that nature was unexplainable but simply that nature demanded a binary description.
Nevertheless, this did not sit well with his positivist colleagues who criticized him for
introducing an unwelcome mysticism into science. Because logical positivism insists on
classifying any fundamentally binary description of nature as “illogical” and “unexplainable”
Bohr seems to have greatly modified his terminology and definitions to accommodate these
prejudices within the academic climate of his day. At the Second International Congress for the
Unity of Science in Copenhagen, June 1936, Bohr publicly addresses these concerns and affirms
his claims stating,

78

…the lessons taught us by recent developments in physics regarding the necessity of a
constant extension of the frame of concepts appropriate for the classification of new
experiences leads us to a general epistemological attitude which might help us to avoid
apparent conceptual difficulties in other fields of science as well. Since, however, the
opinion has been expressed from various sides that this attitude would appear to involve a
mysticism incompatible with the true spirit of science, I am very glad to use the present
opportunity…to clear up any misunderstandings which have arisen…Not only is the well
known dilemma between the corpuscular and undulatory character of light and matter
avoidable only by means of the viewpoint of complementarity, but the peculiar stability
properties of atomic structures which are in obvious contrast with the properties of any
mechanical model but which are so intrinsically connected with the existence of the
quantum of action, form the very condition for the existence of the objects and measuring
instruments, with the behavior of which classical physics is concerned. (Bohr 1998, 83,
87-88)
While it’s not clear whether Bohr was actually a realist or an idealist, what is clear is that
although Bohr is widely thought to have been an idealist according to his later version of
complementarity, yet he maintained, to the end, that reality is material in some way. Finally,
even though Bohr saw complementarity as a means of managing knowability claims, Einstein’s
notorious question of completeness has yet to be answered by the philosophy unless we view
complementarity (necessary opposition) as a fundamental condition of existence as I have done.
In other words, I will primarily be using Bohr’s initial conception of complementarity (which
incidentally has persisted as the current textbook definition of complementarity as well) or the
complementarity of the wave and particle pictures of nature, in order to demonstrate that
complementarity contains all six primary features of what I am calling the theory of necessary
opposition. However, those who would further complicate the discussion by exploring a
complete exposition of Bohr’s ideas will discover that the seemingly conflicting features of
Bohr’s initial and post WWII positions serve only to support my argument by confirming that
even Bohr’s philosophy of binary existence seems to be in itself binary.
It has been said generally that complementarity is the relationship or situation in which
two or more different things improve or emphasize each other’s qualities and regarding physics
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specifically: The concept that two contrasted theories, such as the wave and particle theories of
light, may be able to explain a set of phenomena, although each separately only accounts for
some aspects.52 Here, the subjective (even metaphysical) notion of necessary opposition is
presented as objective reality and conversely each of the two opposing but necessary “objective”
observations become seemingly immaterial and arguably subjective, although as I mentioned
earlier, Bohr disputes this idea of immaterial matter in later versions of his evolving,
transforming—even flip-flopping philosophy. Bohr did not like the way his philosophy suggested
that the smallest constituents of reality either exist in-themselves in a way that is unknowable to
the human mind or that they exist in some fundamentally subjective way. Regardless,
complementarity effectively establishes (similarly to the Strawson’s work) the relatively “equal
status” of what seems to the human understanding to be objective and subjective experience. It
suggests that what we have come to consider objective matter may come from subjective matter
and that likewise subjective matter may arise from objective matter in a similar way that energy
becomes stored as common matter and common matter is converted into what we consider to be
energy, repeatedly. From the Introduction to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science
Vol. 1 entitled Analysis and Synthesis in Science, as mentioned previously in chapter II, I
reiterate, this time in terms of accessing the necessarily dual nature of the electron by means of
both subjective and objective experience; myth and reason:
…the extension of our knowledge may lead to the recognition of relations between
formerly unconnected groups of phenomena, the harmonious synthesis of which demands
a renewed revision of the presuppositions for the unambiguous application of even our
most elementary concepts. This circumstance reminds us not only of the unity of all
sciences aiming at a description of the external world but, above all, of the in-separability
of epistemological and psychological analysis…Stress [must be] laid on the completeness
of the account of the actual state of knowledge rather than on the elucidation of scientific
52
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methodology…Above all, [we must] realize that even in science any arbitrary restriction
implies the danger of prejudices and that our only way of avoiding the extremes of
materialism and mysticism is the never ending endeavor to balance analysis and
synthesis. (Bohr 1998, 92-93; my emphasis)
Make no mistake, Bohr’s use of “balance” can only be understood as methodological symmetry.
Bohr’s theory is unique in that it goes one step further suggesting, while symmetry provides a
framework in which to classify and relate paradoxical phenomenon, complementarity attempts to
reconcile the paradox. One, states that the phenomenon are compatible, the other, endeavors to
explain how they are.
Though Bohr was thought to have been a realist by some and an anti-realist by others, the
fact remains that Bohr indeed was determined, like Lévi-Strauss and Strawson, that existence be
intelligible from some possible perspective. However, unlike Strawson, Bohr insists that this
possible perspective must not only be potentially or conceptually possible (intelligible at least to
God or by means of intuition or allegorical language) but actually comprehensible to the human
mind. It has been widely attributed to Heisenberg (in concurrence with the ideas of Lévi-Strauss)
that “Nature is made in such a way as to be able to be understood. Or perhaps I should put it—
more correctly—the other way around, and say that we are made in such a way as to be able to
understand Nature.”
While Bohr states explicitly at least twice, once in 1936 following the Einstein-PodolskyRosen challenge of 1935 and again in 1949 in Bohr’s Epistemological Discussions with Einstein,
that complimentarity is “exhaustive” stating,
The apparently incompatible sorts of information about the behavior of the object under
examination which we get by different experimental arrangements can clearly not be
brought into connection with each other in the usual way, but may, as equally essential
for an exhaustive account of all experience, be regarded as “complementary” to each
other. (Bohr 1998, 6) [Stated in1936]
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Although these [phenomena] cannot be combined in the customary manner of classical
physics, they are complementary in the sense that only together they exhaust all
knowledge as regards those properties of the objects which are unambiguously definable.
(Bohr 1998, 6) [Reiterated in 1949]
my argument however, avoids Einstein’s question of “completeness” by focussing on the way
that the electron seems to have at least two distinct, necessary and opposing aspects without
making any claims (although the theory of necessary opposition does imply completeness) as to
whether those two aspects comprise the entire nature of the electron as Bohr insisted.
To this point, I have reasonably demonstrated the efficiency of an integrated approach, I
have also established (at least preliminarily) necessary opposition as a widespread, recognizable
phenomenon and will now present, in chapter IV, the next step of research which attempts to
reveal necessary opposition as, not only a common phenomenon, but a complex, stable and
productive phenomenon as well, indeed the direction in which my ongoing research will
continue. In other words, while chapter III has largely been concerned with demonstrating that
necessary opposition exists and is likely a universal phenomenon by identifying its primary or
common features across disciplines, chapter IV will mainly focus on applying the secondary and
tertiary features of necessary opposition interdisciplinarily in order to better understand and
describe what necessary opposition is.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS

While the theoretical premise symmetry was brought into professional and popular usage
by quantum mechanics near the turn of the twentieth century, the notion of symmetry is ancient.
The following tale “Elephant and The Blind Men” originated in India. It is widely thought that
the story is rooted in Hindu lore. It was adapted into the English poem “Blind Men and the
Elephant” by John Godfrey Saxe (1816-1887). The story (poem) illustrates how “observation” is
predominantly based on previous interaction with the world and basic sensory perception. It also
illustrates how those experiences tend to shape our beliefs and inhibit our ability to be truly
objective. The story warns the reader that limited perspective can lead to gross
misunderstanding; that what seems to be is not necessarily what is. I have included both the tale
as told by a native East Indian53 and the poem by English imperialist John Godfrey Saxe:
Elephant and the Blind Men
Once upon a time, there lived six blind men in a village. One day the villagers told them,
“Hey, there is an elephant in the village today.” They had no idea what an elephant is.
They decided, “Even though we would not be able to see it, let us go and feel it anyway.”
All of them went where the elephant was. Every one of them touched the elephant.
“Hey, the elephant is a pillar,” said the first man who touched his leg.
“Oh, no! it is like a rope,” said the second man who touched the tail.
“Oh, no! it is like a thick branch of a tree,” said the third man who touched the trunk of
the elephant.
“It is like a big hand fan” said the fourth man who touched the ear of the elephant.
“It is like a huge wall,” said the fifth man who touched the belly of the elephant.
“It is like a solid pipe,” Said the sixth man who touched the tusk of the elephant.
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They began to argue about the elephant and every one of them insisted that he was right.
It looked like they were getting agitated. A wise man was passing by and he saw this. He
stopped and asked them, "What is the matter?" They said, "We cannot agree to what the
elephant is like." Each one of them told what he thought the elephant was like. The wise
man calmly explained to them, "All of you are right. The reason every one of you is
telling it differently because each one of you touched the different part of the elephant.
So, actually the elephant has all those features what you all said."
“Oh!” everyone said. There was no more fight. They felt happy that they were all right.
In Jainism,54 it is explained that truth can be stated in seven different ways. It teaches us
to be tolerant towards others for their viewpoints. This is known as the Syadvada,
Anekantvad, or the Theory of Manifold Predictions.
Blind Men and the Elephant
It was six men of Indostan, to learning much inclined
Who went to see the Elephant (though all of them were blind)
That each by observation, might satisfy his mind
The First approached the Elephant, And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side, at once began to bawl:
“God bless me! but the Elephant is very like a wall!”
The Second, feeling of the tusk, cried, “Ho! what have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp? To me ’tis mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant is very like a spear!”
The Third approached the animal and happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands, thus boldly up and spake:
“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant is very like a snake!
The Fourth reached out an eager hand and felt about the knee.
“What most this wondrous beast is like is mighty plain,” quoth he;
“ ‘Tis clear enough the Elephant Is very like a tree!”
The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear, said: “E’en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most; deny the fact who can
This marvel of an Elephant is very like a fan!”

54
Jainism, traditionally known as Jaina Shasana or Jaina dharma, is generally considered one of the oldest religions
in the world and has over six million members. It is an Indian religion that emphasizes spiritual interdependence and
equality between all forms of life. The three main principles of Jainism are Ahimsa (Non-Violence), Anekantvad
(Non-Absolutism) and Aparigraha (Non-Possessiveness). (http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/jainism/ as well
as, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism)
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The Sixth no sooner had begun, about the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail that fell within his scope,
“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant is very like a rope!”
And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion, exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right and all were in the wrong! (My emphasis)
So oft in theologic [or interdisciplinary] wars, the disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant not one of them has seen!
Though the poem is typically employed to promote religious tolerance, I would like to
relate it to my particular notion of interdisciplinarity and the manifold nature of existence. If
discrepancy is the actual or superficial
lack of compatibility between two or
more facts, then symmetry
(distinction without difference) is the
means whereby the apparent
discrepancies between disciplines and
the varied aspects of existence that
their respective methods disclose (not
to mention the particular jargon they use to describe it) may be somewhat, if not entirely,
reconciled. That is to say (as with the blind men of Indostan in the story), each discipline may be
effectively disclosing a particular aspect of existence with great clarity and conviction, yet in
doing so, concealing other aspects in the process. However, the message from the story, that all
of them were in the right and the poem, that all of them were partly in the right and partly in the
wrong, only gets us so far. If, like the blind men of Indostan, we merely recognize that our
perspective is limited once a seeing individual (a theory in the case of my thesis) hears us

85

arguing and guides our minds to a more complete picture, we still may miss the mark if we
merely mash our independent views together as the figure above illustrates. Rather we must
recognize that methodological symmetry assumes that while each discipline may be saying
different things about a given phenomenon, they are nevertheless describing the same
phenomenon and therefore an interdisciplinary dialogue (as indicated in chapter one) that is nonhierarchical in nature is requisite.
Because symmetry (distinction without difference) is currently the only premise that
sufficiently accommodates necessary opposition, any meaningful interdisciplinary application of
necessary opposition as a fundamental construct of reality must assume: 1) Phenomenological
symmetry demands methodological symmetry and methodological symmetry demands
phenomenological symmetry; 2) “Some significant portion of traditional supernatural belief is
associated with accurate observations and interpreted rationally” (Hufford 1982, xvii). and
likewise, some significant portion of scientific natural belief is associated with inaccurate
observations and misinterpreted; 3) Concurrent oneness and manyness, or simultaneous
individuality and universality, is perhaps the ultimate expression of necessary opposition.
The primary features (conservative elements) of the theory of necessary opposition,
which my thesis has already indicated seem to persist across space and time, suggest that each
discipline may simply be dealing with a single phenomenon in different ways. However, the
features I have outlined thus far are meant principally to indicate that further investigation is
worthwhile and potentially fertile. In other words, though the features I have attributed to
necessary opposition will likely require revision as more arguments are considered, I believe the
list of shared features I have compiled in chapter two certainly justify the legitimacy, even
necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to mythological themes and serve as a starting point
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for further analysis. Indeed, these common features seem to point towards a more general
classification for how things exist.
Rather than assume the primary features I have identified in chapter III are conclusive
evidence of necessary opposition being a universal characteristic of existence, I suggest we
inquire further to determine if the theory of necessary opposition is generalizable within each
discipline and not just across disciplines using select examples the way I have done to this point.
Additionally, while it is tempting to simply ignore secondary and tertiary features (dynamic
elements) of the theory of necessary opposition by assuming them to be either the unruly
innovations of culture or the
misunderstandings and miscalculations of
philosophy and science, I argue that we
consider whether they are generalizable
within each discipline first. In other words,
tertiary features may in fact be primary
within each discipline and only become
tertiary when compared interdisciplinarily. Again, because certain features of necessary
opposition in myth may not generalize across disciplines, they may yet persist between all myths
(which incidentally is how I came upon necessary opposition in the first place, noticing that all
myths contained some description of binary phenomenon). When this happens, I suggest that
these tertiary elements—as incredulous as they may seem—denote significant empirical data that
should be seen as potentially informative characteristics of necessary opposition which have
gone unnoticed by science and philosophy; aspects which may reveal new classes of phenomena
(supernatural realities) in the process. Likewise, tertiary features from philosophy and physics
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may provide insights into novel relationships in nature that ultimately explain folk belief in
rational terms. For this reason, chapter three will primarily be a demonstration of how productive
tertiary features can be—even when they are unique to one account only (as with the Salish
account of the woman splitting the hare`s nose with a stick, for example) and thereby seemingly
inconsistent within each discipline’s account of existence. Or, as in the case of Bohr’s
philosophy not really aligning with other physicists and yet being very comparable to the
mythical Mayan account of necessary opposition—Teotl, perhaps some tertiary features become
substantiated only when compared across disciplines. In my mind, this kind of comprehensive
investigation ought to be fluid, ongoing and as collaborative and comprehensive as possible.55
When developing unconventional alliances, we may have to assert ourselves beyond what
is comfortable. I recall the first time I shared my project The Symmetry of God with a tenured
professor of theoretical physics. We had talked extensively about the history of physics,
symmetry and the idea of an interdisciplinary discourse that sincerely considered both science
and tradition, before I pulled out the piece of paper containing equations I had derived from
primarily biblical references.56 He took one look, chuckled and holding up my equations, said to
his graduate student (who had been eavesdropping with genuine interest as he filled up four
whiteboards with a steady stream of calculations), “Solve that Jeff.” He then informed me, “As
interesting as your ideas are, until you can do that (pointing to the equations on the board) no
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Some suggested scholarly works (in addition to the list begun in the introduction of my thesis) that one could
profitably initially contemplate in order to further corroborate and elaborate on the theory of necessary opposition
are folklorist Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and The Profane, Giorgio de Santillana and Hertha von Dechend’s
Hamlet’s Mill: An Essay on Myth and the Frame of Time, Husserl and all of the phenomenologists who followed
him including any of philosopher of culture Earnst Cassirer’s writings, philosopher of science and logic Karl
Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Conjectures and Refutations and his ideology verisimilitude, Alfred
Tarski’s semantic theory of truth and his conception of a metalanguage, Erwin Schrödinger’s World View: The
Dynamics of Knowledge and Reality (edited by Johann Götschl), David Bohm’s Wholeness and the Implicate Order,
James Maffie’s Aztec Philosophy—just to name a few—and of course all traditional creation narratives ought to be
re-considered in this explicit context.
56
See the Appendix.
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physicist will care about anything you’re trying to say.” To which I replied, “That (pointing to
the equations on the board) is not in my ‘tool box.’57 My contribution is to put these equations
into your mind and in time perhaps you will solve them.” For the first time in our lengthy
conversation, he took a long, silent, serious look at my equations and said, “You have suggested
relationships not yet considered by science; I’d like to hang on to these if you don’t mind.”
Applying properties of equality for real numbers from mathematics specifically and
assuming symmetry and relativity generally, in my study The Symmetry of God, I replaced real
numbers with Christian scriptural references to God. The properties of equality for real numbers
typically include nine logical rules which allow one to balance, manipulate and solve equations. I
have employed four of these rules in my study The Symmetry of God: 1) Reflexive Property: For
all real numbers (ideas or phenomena in my case) x, x = x. A number (idea or phenomena) is
equal to itself. 2) Symmetric Property: For all real numbers (ideas or phenomena) x and y, if x =
y, then y = x. The order of equality does not matter. 3) Transitive Property: For all real numbers
(ideas or phenomena) x, y and z, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. Two numbers (ideas or
phenomena) that are equal to the same number (idea or phenomena) are also equal to each other.
4) Substitution Property: For all real numbers (ideas or phenomena) x and y, if x = y, then y can
be substituted for x in any expression. The first three properties allow us to define the
equivalence relation between real numbers (ideas or phenomena) and the fourth allows us to
balance and solve equations involving real numbers (ideas or phenomena).58
For the purpose of this particular study, when God is mentioned in any account, God =
God59 (reflexive property). If God is equal (as indicated by the first person singular conjugation
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A colloquial term I often use to refer to specialized skills, attitudes and understandings, often associated with
various academic disciplines or cultural traditions.
58
http://hotmath.com/hotmath_help/topics/properties-of-equality.html
59
“…I AM THAT I AM…” Exodus 3:14
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of the verb to be), to Love,60 then Love is equal to God (symmetric property). Likewise, if God =
Love and Love = Light,61 then God = Light62 (transitive property). Similarly, if God = Love, then
Love (or Light or Life63 or All Things (Matter)64 as per the transitive property) can be God in any
expression (substitution property), for example, Love = Life.65
When asked how he was able to discover novel relationships in nature (relationships for
which there seemed to be no antecedent or indication of), Nobel Prize winning theoretical
physicist Paul Dirac simply replied, “A great deal of my work is just playing with equations and
seeing what they give” (Wilczek 2003, 45). Essentially that is what I have attempted to do here.
At least two important implications of this particular work in progress are: When we
apply a scientific model to Christian references about God—or we can say a universal being or
power of some kind 1) we find there arise relationships for which no Christian reference exists
and 2) we discover that at least some of the relationships suggested by Christian narratives are
manifest in modern science. For example, Light =All Things (Matter)66 is essentially Einstein’s
equation E=mc² (Mass-Energy equivalence is the concept that the mass of an object or system is
a measure of its energy content67 or the more familiar, energy equals mass times the speed of
light squared), Wilczek’s connection between love and dark matter could be interpreted Love =
All Things (Matter) (Wilczek 2008, 22-23);68 also his statement, “The its are the bits [of
information]” (Wilczek 2008, 34) sure seems to resemble Intelligence (Mind/Thought) = All
Things (Matter) and similarly, Bohr’s view of the quantum of action bridging the gap between so
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“…God is love.” I John 4:8 (4:16)
No direct Christian reference exists.
62
“…I am the light…” John 8:12 and “…God is light…” I John 1:5
63
“…I am...the life...” John 14:6
64
“…all things were made…of him.” Doctrine and Covenants 93:10
65
No direct Christian reference exists.
66
See appendix
67
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence
68
This relationship was explicitly confirmed by me in a personal interview I conducted with him fall 2008.
61
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called living and nonliving things, seems to correlate with Intelligence (Mind/Thought) = All
Things (Matter), Life = All Things (Matter) and Intelligence (Mind/Thought) = Life, just to name
a few. Naturally, the independent scientific pursuit of these aspects of existence has disclosed
very different (and allegedly more useful) insights than those disclosed by traditional means but I
contend that if we stop there we have missed the point. Again, with Heidegger’s idea of
disclosure-concealment in mind, the point is that these scientific relationships present themselves
in the equations derived by passing Christian references through a mathematical filter which in
turn produced relationships for which no explicit supporting Christian reference exists.
Philosophical examples of unanswered Christian relationships introduced by The Symmetry of
God include Descartes’69 “Cogito ergo sum.” (Je pense, donc je suis or I think, therefore I am) as
discussed in his 1637 Discourse on the Method and in 1644 Principles of Philosophy, where
Intelligence (Mind/Thought) is…implying that Intelligence (Mind/Thought) itself is existence.
Descartes believed, we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt (Descartes 1999, part 4,
24-25), that indeed the very act of doubting our existence is proof that we exist while other
knowledge obtained by the senses or imagination could be deceptive. This notion of existence
became a key element of Western philosophy as it was seen as a foundational epistemology.
Spinoza determined that love, which he equated with (as I mentioned earlier) pure unsolicited
thought, is the most essential physical law of nature and ought to be the starting point for all
scientific and philosophical endeavor; indeed the source from which all other knowledge could
be accurately deduced (a notion that was also held by Einstein). In other words, Love = pure
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René Descartes was a French philosopher and mathematician. He is considered the founder of 17th century
continental rationalism, modern philosophy and subsequently western philosophy. As mentioned earlier in the
introduction to my thesis, he is also considered responsible for introducing the mind-body dichotomy although I
along with Strawson would argue he intended the mind-body relation he introduced to be seen as a relational binary
or as two sides of the same coin as I am considering binaries in my research. Incidentally, his notion of the mindbody divide (Cartesian Dualism) and Cogito ergo sum, are considered antiquated by most modern scholars of both
philosophy and science.
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Intelligence (Mind/Thought) and Love or Intelligence (Mind/Thought) = Law70 which for Spinoza
seemed to imply All Things (Matter) and Life, indeed all of nature in its totality.
Although I have presented what I consider to be a compelling start towards a significant
discussion of existence between science, philosophy and folklore, I encourage other folklorists,
anthropologists and religious studies aficionados to further explore: 1) if there are Christian
references I may have overlooked which support some of the implied equations; 2) if the same
equations exist in other sacred narratives, for example, the Hindu idea of intelligence (sometimes
depicted as streaming from the third eye of Shiva, God of creation-destruction) signaling creation
can be seen as Intelligence (Mind, Thought, Knowledge) = All things (Matter) which is further
complicated by the Hindu notion that thoughts produce vibrations71 (a view which recent
scientific studies also seem to support) which signaled all existence into being or the Aboriginal
Australian notion of a primeval melody bringing all creation into existence, which indicate the
relationship Word (Breath) = All things (Matter) or Life (as the Hindu believe all things to be
sentient beings) or perhaps demand the additional relationships Vibration/Song = All Things
(Matter) leading us to; 3) if new equations are suggested by alternative texts from various
traditions; 4) if references can be found in various traditions to confirm the equations implied but
not supported by Christian texts and so on. As I already mentioned and demonstrated, science
and philosophy could likewise fill in gaps, adding equations and giving supporting references to
existing equations. In this way, a more comprehensive index of possible equations to be
considered, both comparatively within the humanities and social sciences and incorporatively by
all disciplines interested in a more complete and unified description of what it means to exist
might be thoroughly developed in time. Once again, my purpose here is merely to suggest that
70

“Love…[is] all the law…” Mathew 22:37,39-40
Nama Rupa is the Vedic notion that all things, including ideas and emotions, have a name and a frequency and are
therefore qualitatively and ultimately quantitatively real.

71
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meaningful and promising interdisciplinary applications of necessary opposition indeed exist and
ought to be pursued.
While Einstein fell short of saying that energy is intelligent, he did demonstrate that
energy is composed of particle-like photons, revealing energy’s material-like aspect. Some
physicists have—surprisingly—theorized that even space may be “mindful” or that it may
possess varying degrees of intelligence and affection. USU theoretical physicist Jim Wheeler,72
in a recent personal conversation with him regarding the apparently superficial nature of time,
ventured a hypothesis saying, “Space, unlike time, requires the existence of a multiplicity of
conscious beings that trust one another.” And Nobel Prize winning physicist Frank Wilczek73
expressed to me in a dialogue regarding observed quantum activity that, “Behavior is not
separate from existence, rather they are two aspects of the same thing…It seems to me that
behavior becomes matter and eventually matter begins to think about [becomes aware of] its
behavior.” In another discussion with Dr. Wilczek concerning dark matter and dark energy, he
explained, “Dark matter is statistical; not genius; not creative; just loosely held
together…Increasing intelligence seems to parallel increasing density and complexity.” This
proposed extended study of my Christian texts based The Symmetry of God is primarily
concerned with a comprehensive classification of necessary opposition, that tertiary features
must be considered by each discipline where the gaps in understanding occur. This is a new type
of index; an interdisciplinary one, which can be presented in overlays. Furthermore, any starting
point would be fine depending on the particular expertise or interest of the investigator.
Additionally, as all accounts of unity, oneness or universality imply necessary opposition due to
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Taken from a private conversation I had with Dr. James T. Wheeler in 2010 and used here with his express
consent.
73
Taken from a telephone conversation I had with Dr. Frank D. Wilczek in 2009 and used here with his express
consent.
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the fact that the world of our experience is manifold and therefore any such accounts of unity
from mythology, metaphysics or quantum unification theories should be incorporated into this
study.
However, all things being “one” need not imply that every account of unity is saying the
same thing—a common apprehension that many academics uphold regarding interdisciplinary
and comparative scholarship generally. On the contrary, because each perspective
unquestionably discloses numerous important and useful distinctions, oneness need only signify
that the manifold distinctions disclosed by various perspectives can ultimately be related together
as a unified whole. In other words methodological and phenomenological symmetry do not
presume that every account is saying the same thing; rather symmetry theory presumes that each
account is saying very different things about a shared or common phenomenon. In summary, as
well as getting back to the over-arching question of my stated thesis: Although folklore,
philosophy and physics are perceived to occupy distinct spheres, are there points of overlap? Do
the discourses of folklore, philosophy and physics contain mythological elements? I think we can
safely say, yes, there are points of overlap, the discourses of folklore, philosophy and physics do
contain mythological elements.

As the figure above illustrates, when we assume symmetry, all phenomena and the
theories we employ to perceive, understand and explain them are essentially uniform. They
become multiform when a particular discipline (or tradition) examines (or practices) specific
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aspects of that phenomenon in isolation or within a limited context. Because the isolated aspects
are in fact related, interdisciplinary research will inevitably produce increasing points of overlap
until the “many” once again take on a more unified appearance. Because conventional
epistemological systems do not currently coordinate or explain enigmatic phenomena with any
acceptable degree of precision, paradoxical phenomena or inescapably opposing phenomena
must be viewed as dynamic, mutually dependent relationships between what only seem to be
inconsistent phenomena. In other words, this dynamic continuum or cycle of the “one” being or
becoming “many” and the “many” being or becoming “one” (a prevailing theme in presumably
all sacred narratives) seems to me the only effective way to comprehend and classify binary
phenomena.

95

REFERENCES

Becker, Bill. 1957. “Pioneer of the atom.” New York Times Sunday Magazine, October 20.
Bohr, Niels. 1998. The philosophical writings of Niels Bohr Volume IV: Causality and
complementarity. Supplementary papers edited by Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse. Woodbridge,
CT: Ox Bow Press.
Calaprice, Alice. 1996. The quotable Einstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Capra, Fritof. 2000. The Tao of physics: An exploration of the parallels between modern physics
and eastern mysticism. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Chang, Larry. 2006. Wisdom for the soul. Washington DC: Gnosophia Publishers.
Clark, Ronald W. 1972. Einstein: The life and times. New York, NY: Avon Books.
Cohen, S. Marc, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C. Reeve. 2005. Readings in ancient Greek philosophy
from Thales to Aristotle. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing.
Dirac, Paul A. M. 1963. “The evolution of the physicist’s picture of nature.” Scientific American,
May.
Dukas, Helen, and Banesh Hoffman. 1981. Albert Einstein: The human side: New glimpses from
his archives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dundes, Alan. 1998. Sacred narrative: Readings in the theory of myth. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Dundes, Alan. 1999. International folkloristics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Eddington, Arthur. 1928. The nature of the physical world. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Einstein, Albert. 1931. Cosmic religion: With other opinions and aphorisms. New York, NY:
Covici-Friede.
Einstein, Albert. 1934. Essays in science. New York, NY: Wisdom Library.
Einstein, Albert. 1949. The world as I see it. New York, NY: Philosophical Library.
Einstein, Albert. 1956. Out of my later years: The scientist, philosopher, and man portrayed
through his own words. New York, NY: Philosophical Library.
Einstein, Albert. 2004. Sidelights on relativity. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.

96

Einstein, Albert, and Léopold Infeld. 1938. The evolution of physics: The growth of ideas from
early concepts to relativity and quanta. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Frank, Philip. 1947. Einstein: His life and times. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Gordon, Isabel S., and Sophie Sorkin. 1959. The armchair science reader. New York, NY:
Simon & Schuster.
Haisch, Bernard. 2009. The God theory: Universes, zero-point fields and what's behind it all.
San Francisco, CA: Red Wheel/Weiser LLC.
Heidegger, Martin. 1966. “Conversation on a country path about thinking,” from Discourse on
thinking. Trans. by John Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1949. The physical principles of the quantum theory. Trans. by Carl Eckart
and Frank C. Hoyt. New York, NY: Dover.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1958. Physics and philosophy: The revolution in modern science. New
York, NY: Harper Torchbooks.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1960. The representation of nature in contemporary physics: Symbolism in
religion and literature. New York, NY: George Braziller.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1971. Physics and beyond: Encounters and conversations. Crows Nest,
AU: Allen and Unwin.
Holton, Gerald, and Yehuda Elkana. 1997. Albert Einstein: Historical and cultural perspectives.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hufford, David J. 1982. The terror that comes in the night: An experience-centered study of
supernatural assault traditions. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hufford, David J. 1997. “Introduction” Journal of Southern Folklore 54:1-14.
Isaacson, Walter. 2008. Einstein: His life and universe. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Jackson, Bruce, and Edward D. Ives. 1996. The world observed: Reflections on the fieldwork
process. Springfield, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Keyes, Ralph. 2006. The quote verifier: Who said what, where, and when. New York,
NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Kizza, I. N. 2009. The oral tradition of the Baganda of Uganda. Jefferson, NC: McFarland &
Company.

97

Kragh, Helge. 1990. Dirac: A Scientific Biography. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Kragh, Helge. 1999. Quantum generations: A history of physics in the twentieth century.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Krauss, Lawrence M. 2012“A universe without purpose.” Los Angeles Times, April 1.
Kursunoglu, Behram N., and Eugene P. Wigner. 1990. Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac:
Reminiscences about a great physicist. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Leach, Edmond. 1962. “Genesis as myth.” Discovery May.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1978. Myth and meaning. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Levy, David H. 1950. “On the generalized theory of gravitation.” Scientific American April.
Mead, Carver A. 2002. Collective electrodynamics: Quantum foundations of electromagnetism.
Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Mechling, Jay R. 1989. “Banana cannon and other folk traditions between human and nonhuman
animals.” Journal of Western Folklore 48: 312-323.
Mehra, Jagdish. 1973. The physicist's concept of nature. Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing.
Miller, William. 1955. “Can we produce an Einstein?” LIFE Magazine May 2.
Moore, Walter. 1989. Schrödinger: Life and thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Mullis, Kary B. 1997. Nobel lectures: Chemistry 1991-1995. Singapore, TH: World Scientific
Publishing.
Olson, Edwin E. 2014. Finding reality: Four ways of knowing. Bloomington, IN: Archway
Publishing.
Oring, Elliot. 1986. Folk groups and folklore genres: An introduction. Logan, UT: Utah State
University Press.
Perry, Whitall N. 1971. A treasury of traditional wisdom. London, UK: George Allen & Unwin.
Popper, Karl R. 1992. Quantum theory and the schism in physics. New York, NY: Routledge.
Popper, Karl R. 2002. The logic of scientific discovery: Logik der forschung. New York, NY:
Routledge.

98

Reeve, C.D.C. 2006. Plato on love. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing.
Santillana, Giorgio de and Hertha von Dechend. 1969. Hamlet’s mill: An essay on myth and the
frame of time. Boston, MA: Gambit.
Schilpp, Paul A. 1959. Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing.
Schrödinger, Erwin. 1967. What is life? And mind and matter. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Scully, Robert J. 2007. The demon and the quantum. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Seelig, Carl. 1956. Albert Einstein: A documentary biography. London, UK: Staples Press.
Shaw, George B. 1946. “Back to Methuselah: A metabiological Pentateuch.” Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Snow, Baron C. P. 1966. Variety of men. New York, NY: Scribner’s.
Spinoza, Baruch. 1994. A Spinoza reader: The ethics and other works. Edited and translated
from Latin to English by Edwin Curley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sproul, Barbara C. 1991. Primal myth: Creation myths around the world. New York, NY:
HarperSanFrancisco.
Stewart, Ian. 2007. Why beauty is truth: A history of symmetry. Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books.
Strawson, Galen. 2006. Consciousness and its place in nature: Does physicalism entail
panpsychism? Edited by Anthony Freeman. Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic.
Strawson, Galen. 1994. Mental reality. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Vergnaud, Jean-Roger. 2014. Primitive elements of grammatical theory: Papers by Jean-Roger
Vergnaud and his collaborators. Edited by Katherine McKinney-Bock and Maria Luisa
Zubizarreta. New York, NY: Routledge.
Wilczek, Frank D. 2003. Proceedings of the Dirac centennial symposium. Edited by Howard
Baer and Alexander Belyaev. Singapore, TH: World Scientific Publishing.
Wilczek, Frank D. 2008. The lightness of being: Mass, ether, and the unification of forces. New
York, NY: Basic Books.
Zee, Anthony. 1987. Fearful symmetry: The search for beauty in modern physics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

99

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aftandilian, Dave. 2007. What are the animals to us? Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee
Press.
Atteberry, Jennifer E. 2007. Up in the rocky mountains. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Aurelius, Marcus. 1945. Meditations. Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black.
Bacon, Francis. 1909. The new Atlantis. New York, NY: P. F. Collier & Son.
Becker, Bill. 1957. “Pioneer of the atom.” New York Times Sunday Magazine, October 20.
Bohr, Niels. 1987. The philosophical writings of Niels Bohr Volume I: Atomic theory and the
description of nature. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.
Bohr, Niels. 1987. The philosophical writings of Niels Bohr Volume II: Essays 1932-1957 on
atomic physics and human knowledge. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.
Bohr, Niels. 1987. The philosophical writings of Niels Bohr Volume III: Essays 1958-1962 on
atomic physics and human knowledge. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.
Bohr, Niels. 1998. The philosophical writings of Niels Bohr Volume IV: Causality and
complementarity. Supplementary papers edited by Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse. Woodbridge,
CT: Ox Bow Press.
Calaprice, Alice. 1996. The quotable Einstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Campbell, Joseph. 1991. Primitive mythology: The masks of God. New York, NY: Penguin.
Campbell, Joseph. 1991. The power of myth. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
Capra, Fritof. 2000. The Tao of physics: An exploration of the parallels between modern physics
and eastern mysticism. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Chang, Larry. 2006. Wisdom for the soul. Washington DC: Gnosophia Publishers.
Clark, Ronald W. 1972. Einstein: The life and times. New York, NY: Avon Books.
Cohen, S. Marc, Patricia Curd, and C.D.C. Reeve. 2005. Readings in ancient Greek philosophy
from Thales to Aristotle. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing.
Danien, Elin C. 2005. Maya folktales from the Alta Verapaz. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology.

100

Descartes, René. 1999. Discourse on method in discourse on method and related writings. Trans.
by Desmond M. Clarke. London, UK: Penguin.
Diels, Hermann, and Walther Krantz, trans. 1969. The fragments of the pre-Socratics.
http://www.sacred-texts.com/
Dirac, Paul A. M. 1963. “The evolution of the physicist’s picture of nature.” Scientific American,
May.
Drummond, Henry. 1967. The greatest thing in the world. Mount Vernon, NY: Peter Pauper
Press.
Dukas, Helen, and Banesh Hoffman. 1981. Albert Einstein: The human side: New glimpses from
his archives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dundes, Alan. 1965. The study of folklore. Upper Saddle River, PA: Prentice Hall.
Dundes, Alan. 1998. Sacred narrative: Readings in the theory of myth. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Dundes, Alan. 1999. International folkloristics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Dupuis, Charles. 1872. Origin of all religious worship. New Orleans, LA: Reprinted by the
University of Michigan University Library.
Eastman, Charles A. 1995. The soul of the Indian. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.
Eddington, Arthur. 1928. The nature of the physical world. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Einstein, Albert. 1931. Cosmic religion: With other opinions and aphorisms. New York, NY:
Covici-Friede.
Einstein, Albert. 1934. Essays in science. New York, NY: Wisdom Library.
Einstein, Albert. 1949. The world as I see it. New York, NY: Philosophical Library.
Einstein, Albert. 1956. Out of my later years: The scientist, philosopher, and man portrayed
through his own words. New York, NY: Philosophical Library.
Einstein, Albert. 2004. Sidelights on relativity. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.
Einstein, Albert, and Léopold Infeld. 1938. The evolution of physics: The growth of ideas from
early concepts to relativity and quanta. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Eliade, Mircea. 1987. The sacred and the profane: The nature of religion. Orlando, FL:
Harcourt.

101

Eyring, Henry J. 2007. Mormon scientist: The life and faith of Henry Eyring. Stephens Point,
WI: Worzalla Publishing.
Farmelo, Graham. 2009. The strangest man: The hidden life of Paul Dirac, mystic of the atom.
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Frank, Philip. 1947. Einstein: His life and times. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Gordon, Isabel S., and Sophie Sorkin. 1959. The armchair science reader. New York, NY:
Simon & Schuster.
Haisch, Bernard. 2009. The God theory: Universes, zero-point fields and what's behind it all.
San Francisco, CA: Red Wheel/Weiser.
Heidegger, Martin. 1966. “Conversation on a country path about thinking,” from Discourse on
thinking. Trans. by John Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, Martin. 1992. Parmenides. Trans. from German to English by Andre Schuwer and
Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1949. The physical principles of the quantum theory. Trans. by Carl Eckart
and Frank C. Hoyt. New York, NY: Dover.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1958. Physics and philosophy: The revolution in modern science. New
York, NY: Harper Torchbooks.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1960. The representation of nature in contemporary physics: Symbolism in
religion and literature. New York, NY: George Braziller.
Heisenberg, Werner. 1971. Physics and beyond: Encounters and conversations. Crows Nest,
AU: Allen and Unwin.
Heuvelmans, Bernard. 1968. In the wake of sea serpents. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
Holton, Gerald, and Yehuda Elkana. 1997. Albert Einstein: Historical and cultural perspectives.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hufford, David J. 1982. The terror that comes in the night: An experience-centered study of
supernatural assault traditions. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hufford, David J. 1997. “Introduction” Journal of Southern Folklore 54:1-14.
Isaacson, Walter. 2008. Einstein: His life and universe. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Jackson, Bruce, and Edward D. Ives. 1996. The world observed: Reflections on the fieldwork
process. Springfield, IL: University of Illinois Press.

102

Jung, Carl G. 1963. Memories, dreams, reflections. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Kant, Emmanuel. 1781. The critique of pure reason. Trans. from German to
English by J.M. D. Meiklejohn. http://www.sacred-texts.com/
Keyes, Ralph. 2006. The quote verifier: Who said what, where, and when. New York,
NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Kizza, I. N. 2009. The oral tradition of the Baganda of Uganda. Jefferson, NC: McFarland &
Company.
Kragh, Helge. 1990. Dirac: A Scientific Biography. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Kragh, Helge. 1999. Quantum generations: A history of physics in the twentieth century.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Krauss, Lawrence M. 2012“A universe without purpose.” Los Angeles Times, April 1.
Kursunoglu, Behram N., and Eugene P. Wigner. 1990. Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac:
Reminiscences about a great physicist. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lama, His Holiness the Dalai. 2005. The universe in a single atom: The convergence of science
and spirituality. New York, NY: Morgan Road Books.
Leach, Edmond. 1962. “Genesis as myth.” Discovery May.
Leonard, Scott A., and Michael McClure. 2002. Myth and knowing: An introduction to world
mythology. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1969. The raw and the cooked: Introduction to a science of mythology.
New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1978. Myth and meaning. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Levy, David H. 1950. “On the generalized theory of gravitation.” Scientific American April.
Lind, Richard E. 2007. The seat of consciousness in ancient literature. Jefferson, NC: McFarland
& Company.
Mead, Carver A. 2002. Collective electrodynamics: Quantum foundations of electromagnetism.
Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Mechling, Jay R. 1989. “Banana cannon and other folk traditions between human and nonhuman
animals.” Journal of Western Folklore 48: 312-323.

103

Mehra, Jagdish. 1973. The physicist's concept of nature. Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing.
Miller, William. 1955. “Can we produce an Einstein?” LIFE Magazine May 2.
Moore, Walter. 1989. Schrödinger: Life and thought. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Mullis, Kary B. 1997. Nobel lectures: Chemistry 1991-1995. Singapore, TH: World Scientific
Publishing.
Olson, Edwin E. 2014. Finding reality: Four ways of knowing. Bloomington, IN: Archway
Publishing.
Oring, Elliot. 1986. Folk groups and folklore genres: An introduction. Logan, UT: Utah State
University Press.
Parker, G. Keith. 2006. Seven Cherokee myths. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
Perry, Whitall N. 1971. A treasury of traditional wisdom. London, UK: George Allen & Unwin.
Phillips, Walter S. 1896. Totem tales: Indian stories, Indian told. Chicago, IL: Star Publishing.
Popper, Karl R. 1963. Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. London,
UK: Routledge.
Popper, Karl R. 1992. Quantum theory and the schism in physics. New York, NY: Routledge.
Popper, Karl R. 2002. The logic of scientific discovery: Logik der forschung. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Reeve, C.D.C. 2006. Plato on love. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing.
Sanday, Peggy R. 2007. Aboriginal paintings of the Wolf Creek crater: Track of the rainbow
serpent. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and
Anthropology.
Santillana, Giorgio de and Hertha von Dechend. 1969. Hamlet’s mill: An essay on myth and the
frame of time. Boston, MA: Gambit.
Schilpp, Paul A. 1959. Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist. Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing.
Schrempp, Gregory A. 1992. Magical arrows: The Maori, the Greeks, and the folklore of the
universe. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Schrödinger, Erwin. 1967. What is life? And mind and matter. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.

104

Schweitzer, Albert A. 1949. Genius in the jungle. New York, NY: The Vanguard Press.
Scully, Robert J. 2007. The demon and the quantum. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Seelig, Carl. 1956. Albert Einstein: A documentary biography. London, UK: Staples Press.
Shaw, George B. 1946. “Back to Methuselah: A metabiological Pentateuch.” Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Snow, Baron C. P. 1966. Variety of men. New York, NY: Scribner’s.
Spinoza, Baruch. 1994. A Spinoza reader: The ethics and other works. Edited and translated
from Latin to English by Edwin Curley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sproul, Barbara C. 1991. Primal myth: Creation myths around the world. New York, NY:
HarperSanFrancisco.
Stewart, Ian. 2007. Why beauty is truth: A history of symmetry. Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books.
Strawson, Galen. 2006. Consciousness and its place in nature: Does physicalism entail
panpsychism? Edited by Anthony Freeman. Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic.
Strawson, Galen. 1994. Mental reality. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Tauber, Alfred I. 2009. Science and the quest for meaning. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
Taylor, Jill B. 2009. My stroke of insight: A brain scientist’s personal journey. New York, NY:
Plume.
Tesla, Nikola. 1900. “The problem of increasing human energy.” The Century, June.
Twain, Mark. 1903. Life on the Mississippi. Boston, MA: H. O. Houghton and Company.
Tzu, Lao. 2006. Tao te ching. Trans. by John C. H. Wu. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.
Ueshiba, Morihei. 1985. Aikido. Tokyo, JP: Hozansha Publications.
Vergnaud, Jean-Roger. 2014. Primitive elements of grammatical theory: Papers by Jean-Roger
Vergnaud and his collaborators. Edited by Katherine McKinney-Bock and Maria Luisa
Zubizarreta. New York, NY: Routledge.
Widtsoe, John A. 1930. In search of truth: Comments on the gospel and modern thought. Salt
Lake City, UT: Deseret Book Company.

105

Wilczek, Frank D. 2003. Proceedings of the Dirac centennial symposium. Edited by Howard
Baer and Alexander Belyaev. Singapore, TH: World Scientific Publishing.
Wilczek, Frank D. 2008. The lightness of being: Mass, ether, and the unification of forces. New
York, NY: Basic Books.
Wilson, Edward O. 1998. Consilience: The unity of knowledge. New York, NY: Alfred A.
Knopf.
Yogananda, Paramhansa. 1946. Autobiography of a yogi. New York, NY: The Philosophical
Library.
Zee, Anthony. 1987. Fearful symmetry: The search for beauty in modern physics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

106

APPENDIX

107

The Symmetry of God
As found in The Holy Bible74, Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants and Pearl of Great Price

If:
God = God
God = Love
God = Word (Breath)
God = Law
God = Truth
God = Light

God = Power
God = Glory
God = All Things (Matter)
God = Life
God = Way
God = Wisdom
God = Spirit
God = Good

“And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM…Thus shalt thou say unto the
children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.” Exodus 3:14
“…God is love.” I John 4:8 (4:16)
“…the Word was God.” John 1:1 (Moses 1:32)
“Christ is the end of the law…” Romans 10:4
“…I am…the truth…” John 14:6
“…I am the light…” John 8:12 (9:5, Revelations 21:23, Mosiah 16:9, Alma
38:9, 3 Nephi 9:18, 18:16, D&C 6:21, 10:70, 11:28, 14:9, 88:6, 50, 93:2)
“…God is light…” I John 1:5 “…Christ…is…the light of the sun, and…the
light of the stars…” D&C 88:7, 9
“…Christ the power of God…” I Corinthians 1:24 “I am…the power thereof...”
D&C 88:7-10
“…all things were made by him, and through him, and of him.” D&C 93:10
(88:7-10, 41, 76:24, Moses 1:32-33)
“…I am...the life...” John 14:6 (Mosiah 16:9, Alma 38:9, 3 Nephi 9:18, D&C
10:70, 11:28)
“…I am the way…” John 14:6
“…Christ…the wisdom of God” I Corinthians 1:24
“…whatsoever is light is Spirit, even the Spirit of Jesus Christ.” D&C 84:45
[equivalence is implied]
“…the Lord is good…” I Chronicles 16:34 “…good cometh of God…” Moroni
7:12 [Perhaps ‘good’ is a noun here rather than an adverb?]

God = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Then:
Love = Word (Breath)
Love = Law
“Love…[is] all the law…” Mathew 22:37,39-40
Love = Truth
Love = Light
Love = Power
Love = Glory
Love = All Things (Matter)
“Charity never faileth…” I Chorinthians 13:8 [Most essential of matter?]
Love = Life
Love = Way
Love = Wisdom
Love = Spirit
Love = Good
Love = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Word (Breath) = Law
Word (Breath) = Truth
“…thy [Jesus Christ referring to Heavenly Father] word is truth.” John 17:17
(D&C 84:45)

74

I have used the King James Version of the bible as it is the preferred text within the Christian congregation (The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints or Mormons) within which I was raised. I have also solicited references
from other Mormon texts such as The Book of Mormon, The Doctrine and Covenants and the Pearl of Great Price.
Any expertise I may have lies in this context however, I intend to branch out and solicit input from members and
specialists of various religions and traditions in order to make this index as comprehensive as possible.
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Word (Breath) = Light

Word (Breath) = Power

“And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.” Genesis 1:3 “…thy word
is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path.” Psalms 119:105 “…their souls
were illuminated by the light of the everlasting word…” Alma 5:7
“…word of God is powerful [full of power]…” Hebrew 4:12 (Alma 26:13, 31:5,
Moses 1:32)

Word (Breath) = Glory
Word (Breath) = All Things (Matter)“By the word of the Lord were the heavens made…For He spake, and it was
done; He commanded, and it stood fast.” Psalms 33:6, 9 “…the worlds were
framed by the word…” Hebrew 11:3
“…upholding all things by the word of his power…” Hebrews 1:3 “…were the
heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth.” Psalms 33:6
Word (Breath) = Life
“Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth…”
James 1:18 “…their souls were illuminated by the…everlasting word…” Alma
5:7
Word (Breath) = Way
Word (Breath) = Wisdom
“…the word…is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.” Hebrews
4:12
Word (Breath) = Spirit
“…the Spirit, which is the word…” Ephesians 6:17 “…my voice is Spirit…”
D&C 88:66
Word (Breath) = Good
“…Good is the word…” II kings 20:19 (Isaiah 38:8) [Words of Hezekiah as
spoken to Isaiah.]
Word (Breath) = Intelligence (Mind/Thought) “…the word…is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.”
Hebrews 4:12
Law = Truth
Law = Light
Law = Power
Law = Glory
Law = All Things (Matter)
Law = Life
“…law…is a fountain of life…” Proverbs 13:14
Law = Way
Law = Wisdom
Law = Spirit
“…not at any time have I given unto you a law which was temporal…” D&C
29:34
Law = Good
Law = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Truth = Light
“…whatsoever is truth is light…” D&C 84:45
Truth = Power
Truth = Glory
“The glory of God is…truth…” D&C 93:36
Truth = All Things (Matter)
Truth = Life
“…we are of the truth…” I John 3:18-19
Truth = Way
Truth = Wisdom
Truth = Spirit
“…the Spirit is truth.” I John 5:6 (D&C 88:66)
Truth = Good
“…Is it not good, if…truth be in my days?” II Kings 20:19
Truth = Intelligence (Mind/Thought) “…intelligence, in other words…truth…” D&C 93:29, 36 “…truth is
knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and…are to come;” D&C
93:24
Light = Power
Light = Glory
“…the glory of God did lighten it [the earth]…” [no need of the sun]
Revelations 21:23-24 “The glory of God is…light…” D&C 93:36 (76:70)
Light = All Things (Matter)
Light = Life
“…and the life was the light of men…And the light shineth in darkness…” John
1:4-5 “…their souls were illuminated by the light…” Alma 5:7 (D&C 76:70)
Light = Way
Light = Wisdom
“…a man’s wisdom maketh his face to shine…” Ecclesiastes 8:1
Light = Spirit
“…whatsoever is light is Spirit…” D&C 84:45
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Light = Good

“…God saw the light, that it was good…” Genesis 1:4 (Moses 2:4, Abraham
4:4) “…whatsoever is light, is good…” Alma 32:35
Light = Intelligence (Mind/Thought) “…intelligence, in other words, light…” D&C 93:29, 36
Power = Glory
Power = All Things (Matter)
Power = Life
Power = Way
Power = Wisdom
Power = Spirit
Power = Good
Power = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Glory = All Things (Matter)
Glory = Life
“…he [man] is the…glory of God…” I Chorinthians 11:7 (D&C 76:70)
Glory = Way
Glory = Wisdom
Glory = Spirit
Glory = Good
Glory = Intelligence
“The Glory of God is intelligence…” D&C 93:36
All Things (Matter) = Life
All Things (Matter) = Way
All Things (Matter) = Wisdom
“To him that by wisdom made the heavens…” Psalms136:5-9
All Things (Matter) = Spirit
“There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter…” D&C 131:7
All Things (Matter) = Good
All Things (Matter) = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Life = Way
Life = Wisdom
Life = Spirit
Life = Good
Life = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Way = Wisdom
Way = Spirit
Way = Good
Way = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Wisdom = Spirit
Wisdom = Good
Wisdom = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Spirit = Good
Spirit = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)
Good = Intelligence (Mind/Thought)

